“…With respect to the theory of mind (i.e., inferring other people's mental states; Premack and Woodruff, ), ADI present deficits in understanding affective states (e.g., faux pas, irony) (Amenta et al., ; Maurage et al., ; Thoma et al., ) but with a potential preservation of the abilities related to identifying nonaffective states (e.g., false beliefs) (Bosco et al., ; Maurage et al., ; but for contrasting results, see Maurage et al., ), while contradictory results have been found for this ability. On the one hand, ADI are able to correctly understand intentions and thoughts displayed in short videos of social interactions (Maurage et al., ) and to correctly perform a short version of the Strange Stories Test (Bosco et al., ; Happé et al., ), presenting scenarios that require participants to understand characters’ nonemotional mental states (e.g., bluffing, lies, persuasion). On the other hand, some ADI seemed to have impaired abilities in tracking the other person's mental state in a false belief task (Maurage et al., ), while more than 50% of the ADI did not present any deficit on this task.…”