Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments

Young, Liane; Camprodon, Joan A.; Hauser, Marc D.; Pascual‐Leone, Álvaro; Saxe, Rebecca

doi:10.1073/pnas.0914826107

Cited by 504 publications

(464 citation statements)

References 53 publications

(70 reference statements)

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“…Developmental studies have shown that children's motive-based moral reasoning was positively correlated with their false-belief understanding, suggesting a relation between children's theory of mind and the domain of moral judgment (Baird & Astington, 2004). This close connection between moral judgment and ToM is further supported by recent neuroimaging evidence (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010;Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). Moral judgments require that participants balance evaluations of the actual outcomes against considerations of the agent's desires, beliefs and intention, which rely upon ToM reasoning.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Moral judgment in adults with autism spectrum disorders

et al. 2011

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a b s t r a c tThe ability of a group of adults with high functioning autism (HFA) or Asperger Syndrome (AS) to distinguish moral, conventional and disgust transgressions was investigated using a set of six transgression scenarios, each of which was followed by questions about permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency and justification. The results showed that although individuals with HFA or AS (HFA/AS) were able to distinguish affect-backed norms from conventional affect-neutral norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness and authority-dependence, they failed to distinguish moral and disgust transgressions along the seriousness dimension and were unable to provide appropriate welfare-based moral justifications. Moreover, they judged conventional and disgust transgressions to be more serious than did the comparison group, and the correlation analysis revealed that the seriousness rating was related to their ToM impairment. We concluded that difficulties providing appropriate moral justifications and evaluating the seriousness of transgressions in individuals with HFA/AS may be explained by an impaired cognitive appraisal system that, while responsive to rule violations, fails to use relevant information about the agent's intentions and the affective impact of the action outcome in conscious moral reasoning.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Moral judgment in adults with autism spectrum disorders

et al. 2011

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“…To agree with subjective claims, it is assumed that participants must hold on to some mental state representation (either their own or others', see Saxe, 2009). Haxby, 2007;Ruby & Decety, 2003;Saxe & Kanwisher 2003;Saxe & Powell, 2006;Vogeley et al, 2001;Young et al, 2010;Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007;Young, Scholz & Saxe, 2011;Young & Saxe, 2008;2009). Some ToM ROIs, such as RTPJ, have been shown to play a critical role in moral judgment (Young et al, 2010;Young & Saxe, 2009); however, researchers have hypothesized that these regions are critical to processes underlying moral judgment (e.g.…”

Section: Metaethics and Mental State Representationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By contrast, objective claims are mind-independent (e.g. "2 + 2 = 4" is true, regardless of what anyone believes; Goodwin & Darley, 2010;Sayre-McCord, 1986 What this all means for moral claims, is that if morals are represented as subjective, then they should elicit greater activity in brain regions responsible for mental state representation.This hypothesis is made testable by recent work in social neuroscience: a set of brain regionsthe Theory of Mind (ToM) network-has been consistently implicated in mental state representation (Amodio & Frith, 2006;Decety & Cacioppo, 2012;Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003;Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010;Young & Saxe, 2009; for reviews see Schurz et al, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Within this network, some regions of interest (ROIs) are more active during tasks that involve general forms of social cognition, such as trait inference, or assessing the similarity of others to the self (dorsal/ventral-medial prefrontal cortex; DMPFC, VMPFC; Amodio & Frith, 2006;Decety & Cacioppo, 2012;Harris, Todorov, & Fiske, 2005; Jenkins & Mitchell, 2010;Ma, Vandekerckhove, Van Hoeck, & Van Overwalle, 2012;Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005;Ochsner et al, 2005;Schurz et al, 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009;Young & Saxe, 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.

Theriault¹,

Waytz²,

Heiphetz³

et al. 2017

Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

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OVERLAP IN MORALS, FACTS, AND PREFERENCES 2Metaethical judgments refer to judgments about the information expressed by moral claims.Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the Theory of Mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common.Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships.Keywords: metaethics, morality, social cognition, fMRI, theory of mind OVERLAP IN MORALS, FACTS, AND PREFERENCES 3Examining overlap in behavioral and neural representations of morals, facts, and preferences.Moral claims (e.g. "eating meat is wrong") can be evaluated on multiple levels. One may agree or disagree with a given claim (a first-order judgment); however, independent of this, one may make a second-order (i.e. metaethical) judgment-regardless of whether you agree or disagree, what information does the claim express? Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are either true or false, and that this truthfulness is independent of anyone's personal beliefs (i.e. moral claims are akin to facts). By contrast, moral subjectivists believe that personal beliefs govern whether moral claims are true-or that moral claims cannot be true or false at all (i.e. moral claims are akin to preferences; Sayre-McCord, 1986; for review, see Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Metaethical questions are the subject of intense philosophical debate, yet they are highly relevant to cognitive, social, and moral psychology. Metaethical questions ask how moral information is represented. It is possible that morals are represented...

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“…Convergent TMS evidence suggests that temporarily disrupting RTPJ activity using online and offline TMS has the most pronounced effect on moral judgments of attempted harms as well, biasing participants to judge attempted harms more leniently, based on the neutral outcome, rather than the negative intent (Young, et al, 2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The critical role of these brain regions, including the RTPJ, for evaluating harmful actions has also been the topic of recent research, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010) and fMRI . For example, the same regions for theory of mind in non-moral contexts were recruited when participants read explicit statements of agents' beliefs about whether or not they would cause harm (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%