Dispute settlement mechanisms and maritime boundary settlements

Ásgeirsdóttir, Áslaug; Steinwand, Martin C.

doi:10.1007/s11558-015-9217-9

Cited by 13 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…whether dyads settle land borders before turning to maritime ones, or whether these two claim types are linked together), as well as differences in settlement processes across claim types. Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand (2015) capture much of what is needed to create a dataset for maritime borders that is analogous to the IBAD. As more of their data become publicly available, we will consider further whether it might be used alongside the IBAD to offer coverage that our dataset currently lacks.…”

Section: Future Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The International Border Agreements Dataset

Owsiak

Cuttner

Buck

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We introduce a dataset that focuses on the delimitation of interstate borders under international law-the International Border Agreements Dataset (IBAD). This dataset contains information on the agents involved in (e.g. states, third-parties, and colonial powers), methods used during (e.g. negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, administrative decrees, post-war conferences, and plebiscites), and outcomes of (e.g. full and intermediate agreements) the border settlement process during the period 1816-2001. Our focus on international legal agreements and the process that produces them makes the IBAD valuable for those that study not only territorial conflict, but also international conflict, cooperation, law, and conflict management.

show abstract

Section: Future Expansionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The International Border Agreements Dataset

Owsiak

Cuttner

Buck

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Such efforts to bring evidence to theory advance our overall understanding of dispute settlement. Asgeirsdóttir and Steinwand (2015) present a theory of states backing away from legalization in their choice of dispute settlement. The costs of legalized settlement and demands for flexibility in future conflicts lead some states to prefer bilateral negotiations.…”

Section: Toward Comparative Study Of Dispute Settlementmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political logic of dispute settlement: Introduction to the special issue

Davis

2015

Rev Int Organ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the absence of centralized enforcement authority, international institutions have devised a wide range of measures to enforce agreements. At one extreme, states have delegated authority to third party legal bodies to interpret and rule on compliance with authorization of sanctions to punish violations. At the other end of the spectrum, states rely upon peer pressure to encourage compliance and agree to negotiate over any differences of interpretation. Researchers have broadly explored two dimensions of dispute settlement: the variation in design of dispute settlement provisions within institutions and the pattern of state behavior within established dispute processes. This special issue pushes forward research on both dimensions while raising new agenda for probing the political determinants of institutional design and state behavior in dispute settlement. Are judges immune from the influence of power considerations in their rulings? Why do we observe electoral cycles in the pattern of case filings in the WTO? How does sensitivity to interest group pressure shape the structure of dispute settlement? In addition, the articles bring new insights from comparison across issue areas. What explains the variation of dispute design across issue areas? Does legalization of one issue area generate ripple effects that shape behavior for other issue areas? Finally, the articles hone in on critical micro-level differences within dispute settlement. Stepping beyond the issue of why states establish enforcement measures and description of the initiation and disposition of cases, the articles consider details such as the economic stakes at hand and conditions that favor resolving disputes with direct compensation.The challenge to cooperation arises from uncertainty over compliance given incentives for others to cheat or free ride in the face of mixed incentives and collective action problems. This places dispute settlement at the heart of any theory of cooperation. Institutions work to the extent they can provide information that lowers

show abstract

“…Cooperation is necessary because, for example, sea resources are finite (Naylor et al 2009), overfishing can lead to depletion (Mack 1995;Roberts 2002) and many fish species are migratory (Balton 1996). As argued by Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand (2015), this type of cooperation occurs because states prefer institutionalized forms of dispute settlement. In another work, Ásgeirsdóttir and Steinwand (2018) demonstrated how regimes shape state behaviour, arguing that the law of the sea created a default mode in disputes over boundaries, making them converge to the median line.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%