Dispute Initiation and Alliance Obligations in Regional Economic Institutions

Abstract

States increasingly incorporate alliance obligations into the design of multilateral trade agreements to deter aggression. Regional economic institutions (REIs) are such an example. This policy activity raises the question of whether REI military alliance obligations send signals and function as institutional constraints that deter aggression. Hypotheses regarding the influence of (1) shared REI military alliance obligations on dispute initiation and (2) REI military alliance obligations on whether a potential challenger will initiate a militarized dispute against a potential target are tested. African REIs, states, and their dispute initiations from 1950 to 2000 compose the sample. Logit analysis of time-series, cross-section data is the method employed. African REI military alliances are an example of African international relations’ exceptionalism and innovation in institutional design. Findings suggest African REI military alliance obligations reduce the propensity for aggression between member-states and reduce the likelihood that a potential challenger will attack a potential target and a potential target will be the object of attack. The evidence in this article indicates that such commitments reduce dispute initiation among African states.

Systemic Transitions

“…Virtually 70% of the death rate is accounted for by regional and sub-regional organizations, with the subSaharan African region accounting for nearly 60% of total regional FIGO deaths. Thus, the observed high death rate does not appear to be directly related to the cold war's end but rather to an outcome consistent with African states experimenting liberally with alternative organizational arrangements (e.g., Powers 2004).…”

Trade and asymmetric alliances

“…Even though they generally lack the capacity to project power far beyond their borders, minor powers might still make alliance commitments to their neighbors. For example, Powers (2004Powers ( , 2006 points out that some African regional economic institutions also function as alliances. As a test of its robustness, the hypothesis that states are more likely to form alliances with their trading partners model will also be estimated on a sample of minor powers separated by distances of less than 500 miles.…”

Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence

“…They find that specifying economic agreements in alliance treaties is a good predictor of trade among states. Powers (2006) looks at regional economic institutions (REIs) as special types of economic alliances. Through an in-depth study of African REIs, she finds that membership in such organizations reduces conflict among members.…”