Disputation and Change of Belief Burley’s Theory of Obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision

Lagerlund, Henrik; Olsson, Erik J

doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9713-5_2

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…K C is interpreted as a common knowledge set, that should be shared by all participants of the disputation. Although we can adopt the idea that those disputations were merely a 'convenient fiction' expressed in [11], nevertheless from the conceptual point of view K C represents a set of agent's knowledge and beliefs (in some formalizations even an ordered one) whereas C n might contain both common knowledge and beliefs 13 and propositions accepted in the flow of the game. But that means that the commitment store does not distinguish between common knowledge and the propositions accepted in the game, so we can not define any priority with respect to them as is done by Lagerlund and Olsson [11].…”

Section: Why Obligation Games Are Not Disputations De Obligationibus?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Hamblin’s Formal Dialectic Tells About the Medieval Logical Disputation

Pavlova¹

2017

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In this paper we reconstruct a famous Severin Boethius’s reasoning according to the idea of the medieval obligationes disputation mainly focusing on the formalizations proposed by Ch. Hamblin. We use two different formalizations of the disputation: first with the help of Ch. Hamblin’s approach specially designed to formalize such logical debates; second, on the basis of his formal dialectics. The two formalizations are used to analyze the logical properties of the rules of the medieval logical disputation and that of their formal dialectic’s counterparts. Our aim is to to show that Hamblin’s formal dialectic is a communicative protocol for rational agents whose structural rules may differ, thus, varying its normative character. By means of comparing Hamblin’s reconstructions with the one proposed by C. Dutilh-Novaes we are able to justify the following conclusions: (1) the formalization suggested by Hamblin fails to reconstruct the full picture of the disputation because it lacks in some the details of it; (2) Hamblin’s formal dialectic and the medieval logical disputation are based on different logical theories; (3) medieval logical disputation, represented by the formalization of C. Dutilh-Novaes, and the two ones of Hamblin encode different types of cognitive agents. DOI: 10.21146/2074-1472-2017-23-1-151-176

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Section: Why Obligation Games Are Not Disputations De Obligationibus?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is worth mentioning that the logical and the structural rules in the dialogue logic by P. Lorenzen and K. Lorenz[17] share the same idea of two levels of rules 11. We might also intoduce a notion of static commitment store that is not altered by moves in the dialogue and it's contents are fixed before the dialogue commences[26, p. 35].…”

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confidence: 99%

What Hamblin’s Formal Dialectic Tells About the Medieval Logical Disputation

Pavlova¹

2017

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“…6 Another view that emphasises the inconsistency prevention trait of obligationes is Lagerlund and Olsson's suggestion that a theory of obligationes be seen as a theory of belief revision (cf. Lagerlund and Olsson 2001). The idea is that a set of beliefs K would be revised by the acceptance of the proposition ϕ 0 (the positum) during the very performance of the disputation.…”

Section: Survey Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance

Novaes

2005

Synthese

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I argue that the medieval form of dialectical disputation known as obligationes can be viewed as a logical game of consistency maintenance. The game has two participants, Opponent and Respondent. Opponent puts forward a proposition P; Respondent must concede, deny or doubt, on the basis of inferential relations between P and previously accepted or denied propositions, or, in case there is none, on the basis of the common set of beliefs. Respondent loses the game if he concedes a contradictory set of propositions. Opponent loses the game if Respondent is able to maintain consistency during the stipulated period of time. The obligational rules are here formalised by means of familiar notational devices, and the application of some game-theoretical concepts, such as (winning) strategy, moves, motivation, allows for an analysis of some crucial properties of the game. In particular, the primacy of inferential (syntactic) relations over semantic aspects and the dynamic character of obligations are outlined.Synthese (2005) 145: 371-395

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Counterfactual Conditionals in the Avian Debate: Ars Obligatoria and Possible Worlds Semantics in the Parliament of Fowls

Gabrovsky¹

2015

Chaucer the Alchemist

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Disputation and Change of Belief Burley’s Theory of Obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision

Cited by 3 publications

References 8 publications

What Hamblin’s Formal Dialectic Tells About the Medieval Logical Disputation

What Hamblin’s Formal Dialectic Tells About the Medieval Logical Disputation

Medieval Obligationes as Logical Games of Consistency Maintenance

Counterfactual Conditionals in the Avian Debate: Ars Obligatoria and Possible Worlds Semantics in the Parliament of Fowls

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