Dispersion of growth paths of macroeconomic models in thermodynamic limits: two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet models

Aoki, Masanao

doi:10.1007/s11403-008-0029-3

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…If such a binding condition of group selection to form a macroscopic order could be found, an overarching mechanism could be found to illustrate the processes of a dispersive social system. 4 Thus, even in the case of describing such an interactive process between cooperation and defection, we could be induced to adopt the stochastic approach employed by Masanao Aoki's seminal works (Aoki 1996(Aoki , 2002(Aoki , 2008Yoshikawa 2006, 2007), written partly in cooperation with Hiroshi Yoshikawa. It might be hypothetically true that human beings have both the altruistic gene and the egoistic gene.…”

Section: An Interactive Chancementioning

confidence: 99%

Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

Aruka

Akiyama

2009

J Econ Interact Coord

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this game [Aruka in Avatamsaka game structure and experiment on the web. In: Aruka Y (ed) Evolutionary controversies in economics. Springer, Tokyo, pp 115-132, 2001], selfishness may not be determined even if an agent selfishly adopts the strategy of defection. Individual selfishness can only be realized if the other agent cooperates, therefore gain from defection can never be assured by defection alone. The sanction by defection as a reaction of the rival agent cannot necessarily reduce the selfishness of the rival. In this game, explicit direct reciprocity cannot be guaranteed. Now we introduce different spillovers or payoff matrices, so that each agent may then be faced with a different payoff matrix. A ball in the urn is interpreted as the number of cooperators, and the urn as a payoff matrix. We apply Ewens' sampling formula to our urn process in this game theoretic environment. In this case, there is a similar result as in the classic case, because there is "self-averaging" for the variances of the number who cooperate. Applying Pitman's sampling formula to the urn process, the invariance of the random partition vectors under the properties of exchangeability and size-biased permutation does not hold in general. Pitman's sampling formula depends on the two-parameter Poisson-Dirichlet distribution whose special case is just Ewens' formula. In the Ewens setting, only one probability α of a new entry matters. On the other hand, there is an additional probability θ of an unknown entry, as will be argued in the Pitman formula. More concretely, we will investigate the effects

show abstract

Section: An Interactive Chancementioning

confidence: 99%

Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

Aruka

Akiyama

2009

J Econ Interact Coord

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Non-Self-Averaging of a Two-Person Game with Only Positive Spillover: A New Formulation of Avatamsaka’s Dilemma

Aruka¹,

Akiyama²

2011

Complexities of Production and Interacting Human Behaviour

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Erratum to: Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

Aruka

Akiyama

2010

J Econ Interact Coord

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Dispersion of growth paths of macroeconomic models in thermodynamic limits: two-parameter Poisson–Dirichlet models

Abstract: Non-self averaging, Coefficients of variations, Poisson–Dirichlet distributions, Mittag–Leffler distributions, Power laws,

Cited by 5 publications

References 30 publications

Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

Non-Self-Averaging of a Two-Person Game with Only Positive Spillover: A New Formulation of Avatamsaka’s Dilemma

Erratum to: Non-self-averaging of a two-person game with only positive spillover: a new formulation of Avatamsaka’s dilemma

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About