Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2012 Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communi 2012
DOI: 10.1145/2342356.2342412
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Dismantling intrusion prevention systems

Abstract: This paper introduces a serious security problem that people believe has been fixed, but which is still very much existing and evolving, namely evasions. We describe how protocols can still be misused to fool network security devices, such as intrusion prevention systems.

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Cited by 8 publications
(5 citation statements)
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References 6 publications
(3 reference statements)
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“…We used a vulnerability scanner called Evader 45,49,50 to run the attacks and accompanying parallelization tool Mongbat for creating a database of a million evasion combinations. Evader supports a total of 35 different atomic evasions.…”
Section: Softwarementioning
confidence: 99%
“…We used a vulnerability scanner called Evader 45,49,50 to run the attacks and accompanying parallelization tool Mongbat for creating a database of a million evasion combinations. Evader supports a total of 35 different atomic evasions.…”
Section: Softwarementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The bogus packets are dropped by Internet routers before reaching their destination, but an unaware IDS observes a misleading sequence of packets and eventually misses the attack. Handley et al [78] present a countermeasure, but this fundamental problem still prevails in many DPI-based systems today [133].…”
Section: Intrusion Detection Problemsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Volunteers will set up ScrambleSuit bridges which then publish their descriptors-including IP address, port and secret-to the bridge authority (1) which feeds this information into the BridgeDB component. In the next step, the gathered descriptors have to be distributed to censored users (2). The two primary distribution channels are email and HTTPS [41].…”
Section: Session Ticketsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We consider deep packet inspection (DPI) harmful. While originally meant to detect attack signatures in packet payload, it is ineffective in practice due to the ease of evasion [1,2,3]. At the same time, DPI technology is increasingly used by censoring countries to filter the free flow of information or violate network neutrality [4].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%