Disgust and Anger Relate to Different Aggressive Responses to Moral Violations

Abstract

In response to the same moral violation, some people report experiencing anger, and others report feeling disgust. Do differences in emotional responses to moral violations reflect idiosyncratic differences in the communication of outrage, or do they reflect differences in motivational states? Whereas equivalence accounts suggest that anger and disgust are interchangeable expressions of condemnation, sociofunctional accounts suggest that they have distinct antecedents and consequences. We tested these accounts by investigating whether anger and disgust vary depending on the costs imposed by moral violations and whether they differentially correspond with aggressive tendencies. Results across four studies favor a sociofunctional account: When the target of a moral violation shifts from the self to another person, anger decreases, but disgust increases. Whereas anger is associated with high-cost, direct aggression, disgust is associated with less costly indirect aggression. Finally, whether the target of a moral violation is the self or another person influences direct aggression partially via anger and influences indirect aggression partially via disgust.

How Emotional Frames Moralize and Polarize Political Attitudes

“…However, only anger consistently mediated the effects of frame exposure on social distance. This finding was surprising, but it may be consistent with evidence that anger and disgust drive different social responses to moral violations (Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, ). Specifically, anger is linked to more costly, direct aggression (such as verbal and physical aggression), while disgust is associated with social exclusion and gossip.…”

Moral emotions: A review and research agenda for management scholarship

“…Although most research, to date, supports a socio‐functional account to studying the other‐condemning emotions (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, ; Ford, Agosta, Huang, & Shannon, ; Hutcherson & Gross, ; Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, ), it also refutes theoretical proposals that are modular in nature. For example, Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt () argued that each emotion arises from specific types of moral violations, such that contempt arises from violations of community, anger from violations of autonomy, and disgust from violations of divinity.…”

“…Some scholars approach these emotions as if they are equivalent, interchangeable emotional responses to moral violations (Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, ; Smith & Ellsworth, ). Other scholars combine contempt, anger, and disgust into a higher order emotion that captures moral condemnation (Hutcherson & Gross, ), moral outrage (Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, ), or negative moral emotions (Xie, Bagozzi, & Grønhaug, ). For example, Xie, Bagozzi, and Grønhaug () found empirical support to combine contempt, anger, and disgust into a higher order construct of negative moral emotions.…”

“…For example, Xie, Bagozzi, and Grønhaug () found empirical support to combine contempt, anger, and disgust into a higher order construct of negative moral emotions. Conversely, research also calls for a socio‐functional approach to studying other‐condemning emotions (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, ; Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, ), suggesting that each moral emotion is distinct and has unique antecedents and consequences.…”

Perceived public condemnation and avoidance intentions: The mediating role of moral outrage

“…An individual's anger expression increases when he/she directly affects the moral violation while his/her condemnation decreases. On the other hand, condemnation of a moral violation increases and anger decreases when its target shifts from one's self to another person (Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, 2017).…”