Disentangling the Value of a Ministry: Party Leaders’ Evaluations of German State Ministries

Raabe, Johannes; Linhart, Eric

doi:10.1080/01402382.2013.852833

Cited by 8 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…In this article, I build on the existing analyses that have addressed the representation of women in ministerial potions at the government level (Davis 1997;Siaroff 2000;Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson 2005;Krook & O'Brien 2012;Claveria 2014;O'Brien et al 2015). In the developing literature on 'who gets what' in coalition governments, analyses have shown the importance of political parties and their characteristics for the appointment of ministers (Bäck et al 2011;Raabe & Linhart 2014;Greene & Jensen 2017). This is particularly the case in the European context, where parliamentary and semi-presidential systems dominate the political landscape (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones 2009).…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

Goddard

2018

European J Political Res

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While all government portfolios used to be the purview of men exclusively, more and more women are selected to sit around the cabinet table. But under which circumstances do women get appointed to different ministerial portfolios? This article, proposes a theoretical framework to consider how party leaders’ attitudes and motivations influence the allocation of portfolios to male and female ministers. These propositions are tested empirically by bringing together data on 7,005 cabinet appointments across 29 European countries from the late 1980s until 2014. Considering the key partisan dynamics of the ministerial selection process, it is found that women are significantly less likely to be appointed to the ‘core’ offices of state, and ‘masculine’ and ‘neutral’ policy areas. However, these gender differences are moderated by the ideology of the party that allocates them. Women are more likely to be appointed to ‘masculine’ portfolios when a party's voters have more progressive gender attitudes. This theoretical framework and analysis enhances our understanding of women's access to the government, which has important implications for how ministers are selected, as well as how women are represented in the most powerful policy‐making positions in Europe.

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Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

Goddard

2018

European J Political Res

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“…; Budge & Keman ; Keman ): accordingly, parties claim cabinet positions in charge of their core policy areas. However, it is unlikely that party preferences are exclusively driven by ministry‐ or party‐specific values attached to a cabinet position (Raabe & Linhart ). Thus, we allow for both types of preferences and determine empirically which of these motives prevails by estimating the mixing parameters α i .…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…; Budge & Keman ; Warwick & Druckman ). However, party leaders should actually value both factors when choosing between different portfolios (Raabe & Linhart ).…”

Section: Party Preferences In a Sequential Portfolio Allocation Processmentioning

confidence: 99%

The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach

Ecker

Meyer

Müller

2015

European J Political Res

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Multiparty government in parliamentary democracies entails bargaining over the payoffs of government participation, in particular the allocation of cabinet positions. While most of the literature deals with the numerical distribution of cabinet seats among government parties, this article explores the distribution of individual portfolios. It argues that coalition negotiations are sequential choice processes that begin with the allocation of those portfolios most important to the bargaining parties. This induces conditionality in the bargaining process as choices of individual cabinet positions are not independent of each other. Linking this sequential logic with party preferences for individual cabinet positions, the authors of the article study the allocation of individual portfolios for 146 coalition governments in Western and Central Eastern Europe. The results suggest that a sequential logic in the bargaining process results in better predictions than assuming mutual independence in the distribution of individual portfolios.

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confidence: 99%

“…The allocation of cabinet portfolios among prospective coalition partners is at the heart of the coalition formation process. This is because the control of government departments is the most obvious and important – albeit not the only (Cutler et al 2016: 42) – payoff for political parties in joining a coalition government (Ecker et al 2015; Raabe and Linhart 2014). Since departments differ in the weight they carry in government policy as well as in their overall status and access to resources they provide, that payoff is not only the relative number of portfolios parties control but also their importance and seniority.…”

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confidence: 99%

Who Gets What in Foreign Affairs? Explaining the Allocation of Foreign Ministries in Coalition Governments

Oppermann

Brummer

2018

Gov. & oppos.

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In coalition governments, political parties are concerned not only with how many but also with which departments they control. The foreign ministry is among the most highly considered prizes in coalition negotiations. This article develops hypotheses to explain under which conditions the foreign ministry is likely to be allocated to a ‘junior coalition partner’. The factors that are hypothesized to affect the allocation are: the relative size of coalition parties; the proximity of their foreign policy positions; the party family of the junior coalition party; the salience of foreign policy to the coalition parties; and past allocations of the foreign ministry to junior coalition partners. Employing a crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis, the article demonstrates that although the conjunction of the junior partner being relatively large and it having led the foreign ministry in the past is not sufficient by itself, those two factors are very influential in the junior partner being allocated the foreign ministry.

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Disentangling the Value of a Ministry: Party Leaders’ Evaluations of German State Ministries

Cited by 8 publications

References 41 publications

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

Entering the men's domain? Gender and portfolio allocation in European governments

The distribution of individual cabinet positions in coalition governments: A sequential approach

Who Gets What in Foreign Affairs? Explaining the Allocation of Foreign Ministries in Coalition Governments

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