Disentangling regulatory policy: The effects of state regulations on trucking rates

Daniel, Timothy P.; Kleit, Andrew N.

doi:10.1007/bf01070809

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Given that two-thirds of US truck shipments are intra-state, the bene®ts of Federal regulatory reforms were reduced signi®cantly below expectations. Daniel and Kleit (1995) estimate that statelevel entry restrictions increase average prices of truck shipments between 20 and 30 per cent above what they would be if entry at the State-level was unrestricted.…”

Section: Designing Reform Programmesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Services, economic development and the next round of negotiations on services

Hoekman

Mattoo

2000

J. Int. Dev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

World trade in services amounted to $2170 billion in 1997, of which 40 per cent was cross-border consumption. Though service trade liberalization is hard to model, sectoral and general equilibrium analyses indicate the scope for major welfare gains. Reforms in services will be driven by domestic agendas, but they can be supported and complemented by commitments to GATS disciplines. Developing country commitments in the GATS, as well as commitments in their areas of interest, are limited. Incentives are needed in the next WTO trade round to encourage commitment to a more balanced and comprehensive coverage. The trade inhibiting eect of domestic regulation requires particular attention.

show abstract

Section: Designing Reform Programmesmentioning

confidence: 89%

Services, economic development and the next round of negotiations on services

Hoekman

Mattoo

2000

J. Int. Dev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…(In the thirty-eight states that regulated trucking under 500 pounds, twenty-two had granted antitrust immunity to truckers as of 1987.) Econometric analysis (Daniel and Kleit 1995) of rates in the states that still regulated trucking showed that in the LTL segment, entry regulation raised rates by over 20 percent, rate regulation by over 5 percent, and antitrust immunity by about 12 percent. In the TL segment, only rate regulation had a statistically signifi cant effect on price-more than 32 percent.…”

Section: Trucksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Antitrust and Regulation

Rose¹

2014

Economic Regulation and Its Reform

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Within a brief span of time, Congress adopted the Interstate Commerce Act (1887) and the Sherman Act (1890). In imposing federal regulation on railroads, the Interstate Commerce Act inaugurated the era of substantial federal regulation of individual industries, while the Sherman Act created a baseline for the control of competition in the United States by generally barring contracts in restraint of trade and forbidding monopolization. The rise of the railroads and the great trusts raised concerns about economic power and spurred politicians to formulate a national policy toward competition. Since 1890, policymakers have been forced repeatedly to work through how to interleave a fully general approach to competition under the antitrust laws with industry-specifi c approaches to competition under regulatory statutes. This has been a learning process, but even without learning, shifting political winds would naturally lead to fi ts and starts as antitrust and specifi c regulatory statutes have jostled and combined and sometimes even competed in establishing a framework for controlling competition. After more

show abstract

“…After accession, many EU firms entered the market, but this had no effect on the conduct of incumbent firms because prices remained regulated (Barros 1995).5 Similarly, the U.S. federal government deregulated trucking in the 1970s and 1980s, but about two-thirds of truck shipments are intrastate, and many states continue to regulate the sector. Daniel and Kleit (1995) estimate that state-level entry restrictions raise average prices of truck shipments by 20 to 30 percent above what would prevail if entry were unrestricted.…”

Section: Box 63 When Is Nondiscrimination Discriminatory? the Econommentioning

confidence: 99%

Regional Integration and Development

Cooper,

Schiff,

Winters

2003

Foreign Affairs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A co-publication of the World Bank and Oxford University Press. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank cannot guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply on the part of the World Bank any judgment of the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Rights and Permissions The material in this work is copyrighted. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or inclusion in any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the World Bank. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission promptly.

show abstract

Disentangling regulatory policy: The effects of state regulations on trucking rates

Cited by 10 publications

References 6 publications

Services, economic development and the next round of negotiations on services

Services, economic development and the next round of negotiations on services

Antitrust and Regulation

Regional Integration and Development

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About