Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society

Ventsel, Andreas; Wierenga, Louis; Kasekamp, Andres

doi:10.1080/10758216.2018.1445973

Cited by 37 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…In particular, they briefly point to Ruch Narodowy and the All‐Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska) as both rejecting climate change along cosmopolitan/transnational grounds. Staying in the eastern part of Europe, although noted only in passing by Kasekamp et al (, p. 52), the chairman of the Estonian far‐right party Conservative People's Party of Estonia, Mart Helme, speaks of “pseudo‐scientific climate change.” Also only briefly, Boussalis et al (, p. 108) noted, that far‐right Russian newspaper coverage of climate change integrates climate‐change skepticism in assessments of global politics (“a stateless ‘globalization’ and ultra‐Malthusian scam called ‘global warming’”). In contrast, Hungarian Jobbik is not a climate‐change skeptic party, though climate change is a little talked about issue, as Kyriazi (in press) noted briefly.…”

Section: What We Knowmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate change and the far right

Forchtner

2019

WIREs Climate Change

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In recent years two crises have populated the imagination of publics: environmental crises, ranging from, for example, water and air pollution to climate change, and the crisis of liberal democracy, illustrated by the rise of far‐right actors across Europe, the United States and beyond. While these environmental and political crises have been analyzed on their own, little research has been done on their nexus. Against this background, this focus article reviews existing academic literature on far‐right climate‐change communication by European party and nonparty actors, that is, climate‐change communication from a distinctively ethno‐nationalist and authoritarian perspective. The far right is not a homogenous entity but best viewed as a continuum, ranging from radical‐right, anti‐liberal democracy actors to extreme‐right, anti‐democracy ones. This contribution to WIREs Climate Change argues that many, though not all, far‐right party and nonparty actors are skeptical towards (anthropogenic) climate change and/or responses to it, at least in comparison to the European mainstream. The article does so by reviewing existing research before formulating areas for further research. This article is categorized under: Social Status of Climate Change Knowledge > Climate Science and Social Movements

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Section: What We Knowmentioning

confidence: 99%

Climate change and the far right

Forchtner

2019

WIREs Climate Change

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“…Populist and radical right-wing parties have augmented their public appeal, embedding staunch opposition to minority rights and immigration into the broader frame of their Eurosceptic agendas (e.g. the cases of Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia and Hungary) (Kasekamp, Madison, & Wierenga, 2018;Kluknavská & Smolik, 2016;Kovarek, Róna, Hunyadi, & Krekó, 2017;Braghiroli & Petsinis, 2019). Furthermore, EU-membership has lost much of its attraction among candidate states in the region (e.g.…”

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confidence: 99%

Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe in a State of Flux

Petsinis

2019

Ethnopolitics

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“…Although they are a relatively new party, founded in 2012 out of a merger between the People's Party (Rahvaliit) and the Estonian Nationalist Movement (Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine, henceforth ERL), EKRE quickly went from having no seats to seven seats out of 101 in the 2015 national elections and from seven to 19 in the 2019 national elections. Two of the main tactics that have propelled them to such popularity are grassroots activism and social media engagement (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2019). Kasekamp et al (2019) identify four themes that EKRE successfully framed in their political communication through social media channels: an anti-Russian stance, Euroscepticism, promotion of family values, and an anti-refugee discourse.…”

Section: Ekrementioning

confidence: 99%

“…EKRE and the NA are very similar ideologically and are signatories, along with the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, to the 2013 Bauska Declaration (Wierenga, 2017), a nationalist doctrine which calls for the Baltic countries to maintain traditional social values, and opposes a United States of Europe, a resurgent Russia, and the immigration policies of Western Europe. 3 As Kasekamp, Madisson, and Wierenga (2019) point out, EKRE's initial success is directly related to the father and son duo of Mart and Martin Helme, the party's chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. Th e Helmes successfully merged a social movement, the Estonian National Movement, with an existing political party, the People's Party, to create EKRE (Kasekamp et al, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 As Kasekamp, Madisson, and Wierenga (2019) point out, EKRE's initial success is directly related to the father and son duo of Mart and Martin Helme, the party's chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. Th e Helmes successfully merged a social movement, the Estonian National Movement, with an existing political party, the People's Party, to create EKRE (Kasekamp et al, 2019). EKRE gained parliamentary representation for the fi rst time in 2015, at a time when the electoral climate all over Europe was ripe for populism and national conservatism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bauska’s Chairmen: Party Leadership and Twitter Engagement in Estonian and Latvian Populist Far-Right Parties

Wierenga

2019

Polish Political Science Review

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Political parties in the Baltic states remain largely understudied, especially when it comes to the populist radical right (PRR). Currently, two of the three Baltic countries have PRR parties represented in their national parliaments, Nacionā lā apvienī ba (the National Alliance, henceforth the NA) in Latvia and Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, henceforth EKRE) in Estonia. Both parties have charismatic leaders and are led in a top-down manner, keeping in line with the literature on this party family. Many political actors in numerous countries make ample use of Twitter and other social media, and the PRR in particular has proved very successful at using social media to their advantage.My article provides a comparison between the leadership of the two aforementioned parties, using a paired comparison method, highlighting the position of the party leader; how each leader is selected; the political activity of party leaders; the electoral activity of each leader; and, finally, an analysis of how each party leader uses the social media microblogging site, Twitter.The NA and EKRE are similar in that they are both parties which can be categorized in the PRR party family and are nationalist parties in countries which experienced Soviet occupation as well as the policy of Russification. Further, until quite recently1, both have directed nativist policies around language issues and the Russian-speaking population (Auers and Kasekamp 2013, Wierenga 2017). Therefore, the NA and EKRE make for an ideal comparison.2

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Discursive Opportunities for the Estonian Populist Radical Right in a Digital Society

Cited by 37 publications

References 26 publications

Climate change and the far right

Climate change and the far right

Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe in a State of Flux

Bauska’s Chairmen: Party Leadership and Twitter Engagement in Estonian and Latvian Populist Far-Right Parties

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