Discriminations among perceptual and symbolic stimuli

Abstract

This research compares the time required for perceptual discriminations among pairs of physically present objects (circles) with the time required to discriminate pairs of symbols (nonsense syllables) that subjects learned to associate uniquely with each of the circles. Four experiments show very large differences between symbolic and perceptual discriminations. Discrimination times for the perceptual stimuli declined systematically as their size ratio increased, but discriminations among the associated nonsense syllables showed only a strictly ordinal effect of position in the series. Discriminations among the symbolic stimuli showed a large semantic congruity effect, but the perceptual stimuli showed none. The research does not replicate previous results showing similarities between perceptual and symbolic processing suggestive of image processing. We conclude that in the symbolic task subjects use only ordinal information rather than images or analog representations of the associated circles. We propose that perceptual discriminations show a semantic congruity effect only when they are processed as if the perceptual stimuli were symbolic.The question of how we reason with serial orders is an important one in cognitive psychology, not only because we are frequently called upon to think in terms of serial orders, but also because an understanding of such reasoning will cast light on a broad set of cognitive activities, These cognitive activities include, for example, the process by which a child (or adult) infers a transitive linear ordering of objects on a dimension such as size from experience with a subset of the possible relations among the objects so ordered (cf. Potts, 1972;Trabasso & Riley, 1975), as well as the process by which reasoning with these orderings is accomplished once they are set up.A number of investigators have proposed that people answer questions about short serial orders by using mental imagery or by using "analog" processing that is similar in some respects to mental imagery (cf. Jamieson

The discriminability of remembered magnitudes

“…Although it is tempting to assume that this necessarily implies a detailed, analogue memory representation, it is important to first consider an alternative view. For example, it is possible to develop a plausible account of comparisons between a line and CYC in the present task in the context of the semantic-coding theory of Banks (1977;Banks et al, 1982; see also Shoben, Cech, Schwanenflugel, & Sailor, 1989, for a similar view). The semantic-coding theory postulates that the presentation of a CYC generates a discrete, categorical semantic code (e.g., "long").…”

“…In addition to distance effects, Moyer and Bayer (1976) found that the stimulus set with larger absolute differences between items (i.e., larger stimulus range) displayed faster response times for both the perceived and remembered comparisons. This range effect led them to conclude that an interval scale representation of perceptual magnitudes could be preserved in memory and that subjects can use this interval (analogue) information when performing mental comparisons.Subsequently, Banks, Mermelstein, and Yu (1982) and Henderson and Well (1985) failed to replicate the Moyer and Bayer (1976) memory range effect; suggesting that, at best, an ordinal scale relation holds for remembered magnitudes. However, perhaps less well publicized was…”

“…Subsequently, Banks, Mermelstein, and Yu (1982) and Henderson and Well (1985) failed to replicate the Moyer and Bayer (1976) memory range effect; suggesting that, at best, an ordinal scale relation holds for remembered magnitudes. However, perhaps less well publicized was…”

“…However, perhaps less well publicized was Copyright 1992 Psychonomic Society, Inc.the fact that Banks et al (1982) also did not find a reliable range effect for the perceptual comparisons. Henderson and Well (1985), on the other hand, did not provide a perceptual condition in order to contrast the remembered comparison data.…”

“…Subsequently, Banks, Mermelstein, and Yu (1982) and Henderson and Well (1985) failed to replicate the Moyer and Bayer (1976) memory range effect; suggesting that, at best, an ordinal scale relation holds for remembered magnitudes. However, perhaps less well publicized was Copyright 1992 Psychonomic Society, Inc.the fact that Banks et al (1982) also did not find a reliable range effect for the perceptual comparisons.…”