Discriminability of intracranial stimuli: The role of anatomical connectedness

Stutz, Robert M.; Rossi, Ronald R.; Hastings, Lloyd; Brunner, Robert L.

doi:10.1016/0031-9384(74)90069-9

Cited by 24 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…But it is from these same brain zones that we can evoke the strongest types of diverse self-reports of distinct affective experiences in humans, and the descriptions of feelings aroused generally match the emotional behavioral patterns that are evoked in animals [25], [26]. Further, since we do know that some of the positive effects are discriminated by animals [27] and many can be differentially influenced by direct manipulation of relevant brain chemistries [2], evidence supports the existence of diverse types of rewarding and punishing BrainMind states, not just homogenous positive and negative affective functions.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

2011

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BackgroundThe issue of whether other animals have internally felt experiences has vexed animal behavioral science since its inception. Although most investigators remain agnostic on such contentious issues, there is now abundant experimental evidence indicating that all mammals have negatively and positively-valenced emotional networks concentrated in homologous brain regions that mediate affective experiences when animals are emotionally aroused. That is what the neuroscientific evidence indicates.Principal FindingsThe relevant lines of evidence are as follows: 1) It is easy to elicit powerful unconditioned emotional responses using localized electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB); these effects are concentrated in ancient subcortical brain regions. Seven types of emotional arousals have been described; using a special capitalized nomenclature for such primary process emotional systems, they are SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY. 2) These brain circuits are situated in homologous subcortical brain regions in all vertebrates tested. Thus, if one activates FEAR arousal circuits in rats, cats or primates, all exhibit similar fear responses. 3) All primary-process emotional-instinctual urges, even ones as complex as social PLAY, remain intact after radical neo-decortication early in life; thus, the neocortex is not essential for the generation of primary-process emotionality. 4) Using diverse measures, one can demonstrate that animals like and dislike ESB of brain regions that evoke unconditioned instinctual emotional behaviors: Such ESBs can serve as ‘rewards’ and ‘punishments’ in diverse approach and escape/avoidance learning tasks. 5) Comparable ESB of human brains yield comparable affective experiences. Thus, robust evidence indicates that raw primary-process (i.e., instinctual, unconditioned) emotional behaviors and feelings emanate from homologous brain functions in all mammals (see Appendix S1), which are regulated by higher brain regions. Such findings suggest nested-hierarchies of BrainMind affective processing, with primal emotional functions being foundational for secondary-process learning and memory mechanisms, which interface with tertiary-process cognitive-thoughtful functions of the BrainMind.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

2011

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“…While deep brain stimulation (DBS) allows researchers to demonstrate that brain stimulation at specific sites evokes distinct emotional behaviors that are accompanied by corresponding affects, there remains the question of whether the emotional affects elicited at these sites are similarly distinct. We do know that rats can learn to discriminate between DBS in the hypothalamus and septal regions of the brain (Stutz et al, 1974). We also know that animals can distinguish between the emotional states induced by the addictive drugs morphine and cocaine (Overton, 1991).…”

Section: Primordial Emotions Are Innate But Are Also Adaptive Learninmentioning

confidence: 99%

Selected Principles of Pankseppian Affective Neuroscience

Davis¹,

Montag

2019

Front. Neurosci.

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In the early nineties of the twentieth century Jaak Panksepp coined the term “Affective Neuroscience” (AN) today being accepted as a unique research area in cross-species brain science. By means of (i) electrical stimulation, (ii) pharmacological challenges, and (iii) brain lesions of vertebrate brains (mostly mammalian), Panksepp carved out seven primary emotional systems called SEEKING, CARE, PLAY, and LUST on the positive side, whereas FEAR, SADNESS, and ANGER belong to the negative affects. Abundant research into human clinical applications has supported the hypothesis that imbalances in these ancient primary emotional systems are strongly linked to psychiatric disorders such as depression. The present paper gives a concise overview of Panksepp's main ideas. It gives an historical overview of the development of Panksepp's AN thinking. It touches not only areas of neuroscience, but also shows how AN has been applied to other research fields such as personality psychology. Finally, the present work gives a brief overview of the main ideas of AN.

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“…It seems unlikely that all affects-all those rewards and punishments integrated by the brainare neuropsychologically homogeneous, but much more work needs to be performed along those lines. For instance, although rats cannot discriminate artificial activations at two distant points within one continuous affective system such as the Medial Forebrain Bundle (MFB), they can discriminate MFB stimulations and those applied to other nearby reward locations in the septum [Stutz et al, 1974]. The study of emotional vocalizations may be an especially sensitive gateway into affective minds of other animals [Brudzynski, 2009], and have been proposed as direct-read-outs that can be used as intrinsic self-reports of feelings [Knutson et al, 2002;Panksepp et al, 2002], which may be invaluable for the development of new animals models of psychiatric disorders [Panksepp, 2010c].…”

Section: Brain Sources Of Rewards and Punishmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a cross‐species neuroscientific understanding of the affective mind: do animals have emotional feelings?

Panksepp

2011

American J Primatol

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Do we need to consider mental processes in our analysis of brain functions in other animals? Obviously we do, if such BrainMind functions exist in the animals we wish to understand. If so, how do we proceed, while still retaining materialistic-mechanistic perspectives? This essay outlines the historical forces that led to emotional feelings in animals being marginalized in behavioristic scientific discussions of why animals behave the way they do, and why mental constructs are generally disregarded in modern neuroscientific analyses. The roots of this problem go back to Cartesian dualism and the attempt of 19th century physician-scientists to ground a new type of medical curriculum on a completely materialistic approach to body functions. Thereby all vitalistic principles were discarded from the lexicon of science, and subjective experience in animals was put in that category and discarded as an invalid approach to animal behavior. This led to forms of rigid operationalism during the era of behaviorism and subsequently ruthless reductionism in brain research, leaving little room for mentalistic concepts such as emotional feelings in animal research. However, modern studies of the brain clearly indicate that artificially induced arousals of emotional networks, as with localized electrical and chemical brain stimulation, can serve as "rewards" and "punishments" in various learning tasks. This strongly indicates that animal brains elaborate various experienced states, with those having affective contents being easiest to study rigorously. However, in approaching emotional feelings empirically we must pay special attention to the difficulties and vagaries of human language and evolutionary levels of control in the brain. We need distinct nomenclatures from primary (unconditioned phenomenal experiences) to tertiary (reflective) levels of mind. The scientific pursuit of affective brain processes in other mammals can now reveal general BrainMind principles that also apply to human feelings, as with neurochemical predictions from preclinical animal models to self-reports of corresponding human experiences. In short, brain research has now repeatedly verified the existence of affective experience-various reward and punishment functions-during artificial arousal of emotional networks in our fellow animals. The implications for new conceptual schema for understanding human/primate affective feelings and how such knowledge can impact scientific advances in biological psychiatry are also addressed.

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Discriminability of intracranial stimuli: The role of anatomical connectedness

Cited by 24 publications

References 8 publications

Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

Cross-Species Affective Neuroscience Decoding of the Primal Affective Experiences of Humans and Related Animals

Selected Principles of Pankseppian Affective Neuroscience

Toward a cross‐species neuroscientific understanding of the affective mind: do animals have emotional feelings?

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