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Documents inDownload this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp0370.pdfNon-technical summary: The German system of social welfare is widely perceived as one major cause of high unemployment rates among the unskilled. It comprises social assistance and unemployment assistance. Both programmes provide income support predominantly for those persons who either have exhausted their unemployment benefits or who do not have enough labour market experience to receive those benefits. In the recent public debate, the system of social assistance in particular has been held responsible for creating labour market disincentives on two grounds: first, the level of social assistance is usually considered too high so as to impose sufficient incentives to take up a low-income job. Secondly, further disincentives are created by high transfer withdrawal rates involving a considerable amount of benefits lost when welfare recipients earn supplementary labour incomes. These disincentives effects have led politicians and academics to advocate programs making labour market participation attractive enough to reduce the need for welfare receipt. What is common with the majority of these proposals is that they generally suggest a reduction in effective marginal tax rates in the lower income ranges associated with a decrease in social benefits to stimulate labour supply.The present paper uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to assess the effectiveness of recent social welfare reform proposals in terms of their impact on labour supply and unemployment. We employ the CGE-model PACE-L to simulate a variety of reform proposals. This model incorporates important institutional features of the German labour market. In particular, PACE-L accounts for sectoral wage bargaining and contains a relatively detailed incorporation of the German tax-benefit system. Moreover, the model employs a discrete choice model of labour supply where individuals can choose from a finite set of hours only.Compared to microsimulation studies, which generally take a partial equilibrium perspective, the main advantage of our approach lies in the ability to identify general equili...