Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search

Coey, Dominic; Larsen, Bradley; Platt, Brennan C.

doi:10.1257/aer.20190460

Cited by 27 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…This assumption is motivated in our environment by idiosyncratic differences in willingness to pay across bidders that can arise due to differences in ability to pay, outside option opportunities, or urgency with which the phone is needed. For example, Coey, Larsen, and Platt (2020) demonstrated that eBay auction bidding behavior is consistent with bidders having idiosyncratic, independent deadlines by which they need a particular item.…”

Section: Application To Used Smartphone Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management

Freyberger

Larsen

2022

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This study provides new identification and estimation results for ascending (traditional English or online) auctions with unobserved auction‐level heterogeneity and an unknown number of bidders. When the seller's reserve price and two order statistics of bids are observed, we derive conditions under which the distributions of buyer valuations, unobserved heterogeneity, and number of participants are point identified. We also derive conditions for point identification in cases where reserve prices are binding and present general conditions for partial identification. We propose a nonparametric maximum likelihood approach for estimation and inference. We apply our approach to the online market for used iPhones and analyze the effects of recent regulatory changes banning consumers from circumventing digital rights management technologies used to lock phones to service providers. We find that buyer valuations for unlocked phones dropped by 39% on average after the unlocking ban took effect, from $231.30 to $141.50.

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Section: Application To Used Smartphone Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management

Freyberger

Larsen

2022

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“…Consider one of the CCN managers with r units of residual participation time. Similar to [30], aggressive bidding strategy is considered, where the CCN managers bid more values as they approach the deadline. In this case, the instantaneous bid of a CCN manager can be modeled as follows:…”

Section: Interactions Between Ccn Managers and Cpsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The expected utility of a CCN 13. A simplified version of our analysis is presented in [30] for a retail market, where the focus is on the second-price payment mechanism. In their model, the offered prices of the sellers are not incorporated into the analysis which simplifies their model and derivations.…”

Section: First-price Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Stage Auction Mechanism for Cloud Resource Allocation

Hosseinalipour

Dai

2021

IEEE Trans. Cloud Comput.

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The contemporary literature on cloud resource allocation is mostly focused on studying the interactions between customers and cloud managers. Nevertheless, the recent growth in the customers' demands and the emergence of private cloud providers (CPs) entice the cloud managers to rent extra resources from the CPs so as to handle their backlogged tasks and attract more customers. This also makes studying the interactions between the cloud managers and the CPs essential. In this paper, we investigate both of the mentioned interactions. For the interactions between customers and cloud managers, we adopt the options-based sequential auctions (OBSAs) to the cloud resource allocation paradigm. As compared to existing works, our framework can handle customers with heterogeneous demands, provide truthfulness as the dominant strategy, enjoy a simple winner determination, and preclude the delayed entrance issue. We also provide the performance analysis of the OBSAs, which is among the first in literature. For the interactions between cloud managers and CPs, we propose an auction-based scheme for resource gathering. Through incorporating the offered prices, we capture the heterogeneous desires of the CPs in leasing their resources. We conduct a comprehensive mathematical analysis of the two markets and identify the bidding strategy of the cloud managers.

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“…To the best of our knowledge only Moraga-González and Watanabe (2016) and Garcia et al (2015) introduce capacity constraints in markets in which consumers search sequentially over different producers offering heterogeneous products but they abstract from dynamic considerations. Similarly, Coey et al (2016) study a random search model in which buyers search over time for better prices and sellers sort themselves into a faster auction market and a slower posted-price market, but do not face capacity constraints. 5…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Pricing with Search Frictions

Garcia

2017

SSRN Journal

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Discounts and Deadlines in Consumer Search

Cited by 27 publications

References 51 publications

Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management

Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management

A Two-Stage Auction Mechanism for Cloud Resource Allocation

Dynamic Pricing with Search Frictions

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