Disclosure, Shareholder Oversight and the Pay-Performance Link

Corporate Governance and the CEO Pay–Performance Link: Australian Evidence

“…Consistent with expectations, our estimates on CEO payperformance sensitivities (elasticities) appear to be weaker (stronger) than those reported by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Murphy (1999) in relation to US corporations. The magnitudes of the estimates are, however, comparable to those found for Australia (see, for example, Merhebi et al 2006;Clarkson et al 2011).…”

“…The variation created by this revision process is likely to bias against finding a link between shares/options based compensation and firm performance. 12 Using data collected in respect of a sample of 100 Australian firms between 1998 and 2004, Clarkson et al (2011) shareholders provide managers with an incentive to act in a way that is more congruent with the interests of their employers. Researchers devote considerable effort to quantifying the relationship between corporate performance and executive pay.…”

Corporate governance and CEO compensation in Indian firms

“…The choice of performance measures in compensation contracting differs across countries. CEO compensation is associated with stock return in the USA (Core et al, 1999), Japan (Kaplan, 1994), South Korea (Kato et al, 2007), Australia (Clarkson et al, 2011), and China (Kato and Long, 2006), but not in India (Jaiswall and Firth, 2009), due to the sparse use of equity-based pay in Indian firms (Balasubramanian et al, 2010). Instead, a positive association between CEO compensation and ROA (return on assets) has been documented amid the Indian firms (Ghosh, 2006(Ghosh, , 2010Jaiswall and Firth, 2009;Parthasarathy et al, 2006).…”

Changing board behaviour: The role of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule in improving the efficacy of Australian Say‐on‐Pay

“…This study therefore provides a bridge between the CLERP 9 analysis of Clarkson et al . () and studies of the ‘Two Strikes’ rule by Monem and Ng (), Bugeja et al . () and Grosse et al .…”

“…Prior to the ‘Two Strikes’ rule, Byrnes and Chapple () and Clarkson et al . () examine the impact of advisory voting under CLERP 9. Byrnes and Chapple () find that boards in high‐dissent firms (i.e.…”