Disclosure in epidemics

Hu, Ju; Zhou, Zhen

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2022.105469

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Another line of related work pertains to the recent work on the design of soft interventions to mitigate disease spread. Examples include: optimal design of rotation schemes of safe in-person work (Ely et al (2021)); identifying conditions when fully information disclosure by the planner maximizes expected social welfare (Hernandez-Chanto et al ( 2021)); and optimal disclosure strategy for maximizing welfare in a healthcare congestion game (Hu and Zhou (2022)). All these works choose specific utility functions to model planner preferences.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our results provide new insights on which classes of planner preferences have optimal information disclosure rules that necessarily exhibit a "monotone partitional structure". We also develop a linear programming formulation that provides approximately optimal and practically implementable designs for realistic planner preferences that cannot be directly captured by stylized models (de Véricourt et al (2021), Hu and Zhou (2022)).…”

Section: Introduction 1motivation and Focusmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Optimal Information Provision for Strategic Hybrid Workers

Shah

Amin

Jaillet

2022

2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

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We study a planner's provision of information to manage workplace occupancy when strategic workers (agents) face risk of infectious disease transmission. The planner implements an information mechanism to signal information about the underlying risk of infection at the workplace. Agents update their belief over the risk parameter using this information and choose to work in-person or remotely. We address the design of the optimal signaling mechanism that best aligns the workplace occupancy with the planner's preference (i.e., maintaining safe capacity limits and operational efficiency at workplace). For various forms of planner preferences, we show numerical and analytical proof that interval-based information mechanisms are optimal. These mechanisms partition the continuous domain of the risk parameter into disjoint intervals and provision information based on interval-specific probability distributions over a finite set of signals. When the planner seeks to achieve an occupancy that lies in one of finitely many pre-specified ranges independent of the underlying risk, we provide an optimal mechanism that uses at most two intervals. On the other hand, when the preference on the occupancy is risk-dependent, we show that an approximately optimal interval-based mechanism can be computed efficiently. We bound the approximation loss for preferences that are expressed through a Lipschitz continuous function of both occupancy and risk parameter. We provide examples that demonstrate the improvement of proposed signaling mechanisms relative to the common benchmarks in information provision. Our findings suggest that information provision over the risk of disease transmission is an effective intervention for maintaining desirable occupancy levels at the workplace. Considering various preferences of the planner, our results provide the optimal signaling mechanisms for a heterogeneous workforce facing practically-driven, continuous distributions of underlying risk.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction 1motivation and Focusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Information Provision for Strategic Hybrid Workers

Shah

Amin

Jaillet

2022

2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This approach received a lot of attention on the literature (Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow, 2011;Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica, 2016;Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ming Li, 2017;Anton Kolotilin, 2018;Anton Kolotilin and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019;Piotr Dworczak and Giorgio Martini, 2019;Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Rann Smorodinsky and Takuro Yamashita, 2023;Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack, 2021). It has been used in many applications of information design, including media control (Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin, 2014;Boris Ginzburg, 2019;Arda Gitmez and Pooya Molavi, 2022;Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2022), clinical trials (Anton Kolotilin, 2015), voter persuasion (Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Câmara, 2016), transparency benchmarks (Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak and Haoxiang Zhu, 2017), stress tests (Itay Goldstein and Yaron Leitner, 2018;Dmitry Orlov, Pavel Zryumov and Andrzej Skrzypach, 2022), online markets (Gleb Romanyuk and Alex Smolin, 2019), attention management (Elliot Lipnowski, Laurent Mathevet and Dong Wei, 2020;Alexander W Bloedel and Ilya Segal, 2020), quality certification (Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2020;Benjamin Vatter, 2022), and healthcare congestion in epidemics (Ju Hu and Zhen Zhou, 2022).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

Mylovanov,

Zapechelnyuk

2024

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover’s information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are completely uninformative. Moreover, constructive debates reveal the state under the assumption on preferences that capture autocratic regimes, whereas toxic debates are completely uninformative under the assumption on preferences that capture democratic regimes. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

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Disclosure in epidemics

Cited by 2 publications

References 24 publications

Optimal Information Provision for Strategic Hybrid Workers

Optimal Information Provision for Strategic Hybrid Workers

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

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