Discipline the Party: From Rectification Campaigns to Intra-Party Educational Activities in China

The Chinese Communist Party: A 100-Year Trajectory

“…Similarly, surveys conducted by Bruce Dickson (2014) show that while 'working for Communism' was one of the main incentives during the Mao era (1949-78), it has been replaced by less ideological motives in the post-Mao era, such as advancing one's career. By contrast, some research has stressed the continuity between Mao and post-Mao China regarding the mobilisation and disciplining of Party members and cadres (Heilmann and Perry 2011;Koss 2018;Luo 2021). Speaking to the issue of political loyalty more specifically, Andrew Walder (1985) has noted that, while it has taken different forms over time in response to political and economic circumstances, Party members and cadres' political loyalty has always been central to Party leaders, and the 'redness', or virtue, of Party members and officials was never replaced by expertise, or ability, as a recruitment criterion.…”

“…56 As the Party increasingly fused the question of political virtue with personal and family ethics, Jiang Zemin also asked cadres to 'take the lead in establishing a good family style'. 57 The educational campaign of the 'three stresses' launched in 1998 also called on Party cadres to 'stress study, stress politics, stress righteousness' (Luo 2021).…”

Shades of Red: Changing Understandings of Political Loyalty in the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–2021

“…As the party increasingly fused the question of political virtue with personal and family ethics, Jiang Zemin also asked cadres to "take the lead in establishing a good family style" (Jiang, 1998). The educational campaign of the "three stresses" launched in 1998, also called on party cadres to "stress study, stress politics, stress righteousness" (Luo, 2021).…”

“…Similarly, surveys conducted by Bruce Dickson (2014) show that while "working for Communism" was one of the main incentives during the Mao era (1949Mao era ( -1978, it has been replaced by less ideological motives in the post-Mao era, such as advancing one's career. By contrast, some research stressed the continuity between Mao and post-Mao China regarding the mobilisation and disciplining of party members and cadres (Heilmann and Perry, 2011;Koss, 2018;Luo, 2021). Speaking to the issue of political loyalty more specifically, Andrew Walder (1985) has noted that while it has taken different forms over time, in response to political and economic circumstances, party members and cadres' political loyalty has always been central to party leaders, and the "redness," or virtue, of party members and officials, was never replaced by expertise, or ability, as a recruitment criterion.…”

“…At different times, the question of who must be loyal, emphasising cadres or members more broadly, and how to show it, has changed drastically. When studying the relationship between the party and the individuals who populate it, amounting now to more than 95 million members (Organisation Department of the Chinese Communist Party, 2021) and more than seven million officials (Chan and Gao, 2018), a whole branch of literature is dedicated to better understanding how the CCP did and does think about ability and performance, and how this understanding has changed over time. Previous studies have analysed how work performance, understood in various ways, influences political recruitment and promotion (Landry et al, 2018; Li and Zhou, 2005; Shih et al, 2012).…”