Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content

Abstract

Many viewers presented with a round plate tilted to their line of sight will report that they see a round plate that looks elliptical from their perspective. Alva Noë thinks that we should take reports of this kind as adequate descriptions of the phenomenology of spatial experiences. He argues that his so‐called enactive or sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content explains why both the plate's circularity and its elliptical appearance are phenomenal aspects of experience. In this paper, I critique the phenomenal adequacy of Noë's sensorimotor account of spatial perceptual content. I begin by showing that some of its central claims are in conflict with the phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then argue that shape appearances have no phenomenal reality, thus undermining this central motivation for his account.

Representationalism and the perspectival character of perceptual experience

“…The second option is to reject Schellenberg's specific construal of situation-dependent shape properties in terms of the elements contained in a Peacockean scene and to construe them in terms of some other kind of mind-independent property. 22 The third option is to give 21 For some discussions of Noë's proposal see Siewert (2006), Schellenberg (2007), and Jagnow (2008). 22 One such option has recently been developed in Brogaard (2009).…”

Twin Earth and perceptual content

“…8 We could describe it as simply a case in which the sticks are located at different distances from us, and that the vehicles for representing the sticks consequently are located at different distances from the position representing our viewpoint in phenomenal space. If this is the case, there is no need to assume that there is any phenomenal entity that is bigger than another entity (cf Smith 2002: p. 172;Hopp 2013;Jagnow 2008Jagnow , 2012. There are however other alternatives.…”

Percepción y pensamiento espacial. La veta reduccionista del enfoque enactivo

“…Clark 2001Clark , 2006Clark y 2010, y algunos más han señalado que -a pesar de algunas de sus motivaciones fenomenoló-gicas-el enfoque no captura de modo correcto la fenomenología de nuestra percepción de objetos (cf. Kelly 2004Kelly y 2008Jagnow). En este ensayo quisiera discutir el enfoque enactivo desde una perspectiva que, si bien no es del todo original, me parece que no ha recibido la atención que merece.…”