Disadvantage, disagreement, and disability: re-evaluating the continuity test

Abstract

The suggestion that individuals should be considered disadvantaged, and consequently entitled to compensation, only if they consider themselves disadvantaged (Dworkin's 'continuity test') is initially appealing. However, it also faces problems. First, if individuals are routinely mistaken, then we routinely fail to assist the deserving. Second, if individuals assess their circumstances differently then the state will provide different levels of assistance to people in identical situations. Thus, should we instead ignore individuals' convictions and provide assistance that some, at least, do not feel they need? One set of cases where this dilemma is salient are those in which disabled individuals disagree over whether they are disadvantaged. Focussing on these, I argue that despite objections, individuals should have a voice in determining whether they are disadvantaged. However, I contend that our goal should not be ensuring continuity with individuals' ethical convictions (concerning the pursuits they deem worthwhile or valuable), but their convictions regarding whether they are relevantly disadvantaged (whether they have what they are entitled to).

Public Justification, Evaluative Standards, and Different Perspectives in the Attribution of Disability

“…Independently of this, we do not deny the possibility that experts could have a decisive role in the attribution of a disability at some point. But we assume the thesis that evaluative standards matter in the definition of disability, as endorsed by authors such as those we quote in the opening part of the paper [1,3,4,6,7]. These authors highlight the (not exclusive) presence of evaluative standards in the determination of some conditions as disabilities.…”

“…Below it, if we accept such capability as valuable, we could speak of a disability. 4 The other challenge is represented by the question of where to find the cause of the absence of a capability. Is it located in the physical and mental condition of persons like skills and intelligence, i.e., in the internal dimensions of capabilities [42]?…”

“…In some cases, arbitrary psychiatric classifications have assumed the most brutal forms of political repression: ""Misfits" and politically unwanted citizens were regularly deemed psychiatric patients because of their deviant behavior" ( [2] p. 258). Additionally, recent contributions highlight the importance of a fair definition of values and entitlements of justice for the determination of disability [3][4][5][6][7] and the social and political components of mental disabilities [8,9]. Moreover, the political dimension is underscored by activists who reject the qualification of disability for their condition, which they instead describe as minority 1 , diverse, or atypical.…”

“…Various theories detect the relevant capabilities in different ways. For example, Nussbaum [25] classifies capabilities by having in mind the effective opportunities to achieve what is valuable in human life, while Begon [4,6] speaks about capabilities to exercise control over important parts of our lives that belong to us by justice. Because we leave our discussion abstract, we do not enter into these disputes.…”

“…To establish that a person has a mental disability, we need to determine that her deprivation of capabilities (for example, for working and socializing) below a certain threshold is not caused by the absence of external dimensions of capabilities at the required level (because of dysfunctional social conditions or environments) or economic deprivation. In this case, we would have an unfair attribution of disability and a dysfunctional society, as denounced by Begon [3][4][5] and Glackin [6].…”