Disability and Resurrection Identity

Ehrman, Terrence P.

doi:10.1111/nbfr.12126

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…. natural inclination to be united to the body,” which will be eventually resurrected in a glorified state (Ehrman 2015, 735). That resurrected body, Ehrman claims, can appropriately be thought of as healed without “pejorative” implications vis‐à‐vis any living disabled persons (2015, 738).…”

Section: Disabilities In Heaven and The Problem Of The Soulmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…natural inclination to be united to the body,” which will be eventually resurrected in a glorified state (Ehrman 2015, 735). That resurrected body, Ehrman claims, can appropriately be thought of as healed without “pejorative” implications vis‐à‐vis any living disabled persons (2015, 738). Moreover, receiving a radically transformed body in heaven does not change who one is because disabilities are, technically, a “privation” not willed by God and, thus, can be considered an accidental or a nonessential property of the person (Ehrman 2015, 732).…”

Section: Disabilities In Heaven and The Problem Of The Soulmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That resurrected body, Ehrman claims, can appropriately be thought of as healed without “pejorative” implications vis‐à‐vis any living disabled persons (2015, 738). Moreover, receiving a radically transformed body in heaven does not change who one is because disabilities are, technically, a “privation” not willed by God and, thus, can be considered an accidental or a nonessential property of the person (Ehrman 2015, 732). The essential part of each person resides in “the esse of the soul” (Ehrman 2015, 734).…”

Section: Disabilities In Heaven and The Problem Of The Soulmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disabled Bodies on Earth and in Heaven

Kamitsuka¹

2021

Journal of Religious Ethics

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A vigorous ethical debate is underway about disability rights and selective abortion. One prodisability group criticizes the ableism of abortion based on prenatal screening. Another group supports legalized abortion but harbors serious concerns about disability bias. This essay moves the debate forward by reflecting on the ethics of selective abortion from a particular theological perspective: eschatology. I critically examine the claim that selective abortion contradicts the principle of Samaritan hospitality and the claim that envisioning disabled people in heaven means that selective abortion is an illegitimate use of women’s moral agency. This essay proposes a view of the resurrection using what philosopher call emergence theory, which I argue is prodisability because it conceptualizes how the bodies of beings affected with a disability who die in utero might attain heaven. I also present a view of divine providence that is supportive of women’s self‐determination and self‐trust in reproductive issues, including selective abortion.

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Section: Disabilities In Heaven and The Problem Of The Soulmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Disabilities In Heaven and The Problem Of The Soulmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Disabilities In Heaven and The Problem Of The Soulmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Disabled Bodies on Earth and in Heaven

Kamitsuka¹

2021

Journal of Religious Ethics

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Surgery and Selfhood in Early Modern England

Skuse¹

2021

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Offering an innovative perspective on debates concerning embodiment in the early modern period, Alanna Skuse examines diverse kinds of surgical alteration, from mastectomy to castration, and amputation to facial reconstruction. Body-altering surgeries had profound socioeconomic and philosophical consequences. They reached beyond the physical self, and prompted early modern authors to develop searching questions about the nature of body integrity and its relationship to the soul: was the body a part of one's identity, or a mere 'prison' for the mind? How was the body connected to personal morality? What happened to the altered body after death? Drawing on a wide variety of texts including medical treatises, plays, poems, newspaper reports, and travel writings, this volume will argue that the answers to these questions were flexible, divergent, and often surprising, and helped to shape early modern thoughts on philosophy, literature, and the natural sciences. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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Aquinas on Physical Impairment: Human Nature and Original Sin

Cross

2017

H. Theolo. Review

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Medieval accounts of disability by and large (though not universally) defend what is now labeled the “religio-moral” construction of disability: seeing an individual's disability as a punishment for that individual's sin.1 Unsurprisingly, such models are not much in favor among contemporary disability theorists for a number of reasons, among which we might include the unacceptable thought that an individual with disabilities somehow deserves those disabilities. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) accepts some version of this theory, but one rather different from the standard one (or at least, from what is now generally understood as the religio-moral model). Aquinas sees physical impairments—things that constitute a subclass of what he labels “bodily defects”—fundamentally as punishments for original sin. He is (generally) very careful to distance his account of defects from notions of individual punishment. (When he is not, it is because of pressure from Scriptural sources—though as we shall see below he believes that by and large the Bible, too, explicitly rejects the view that disability could be a punishment for individual sin.) So whatever we think of punishment models more generally, Aquinas's certainly removes one of the least appealing aspects of such models as typically understood. And Aquinas is careful, too, to associate many features of the human condition—not just those identified as a certain subclass of defects – with corporate punishment for original sin. To this extent, his account of physical impairments tends to normalize such impairments, and to de-emphasize their distance from other features of post-lapsarian human existence. While I doubt that what Aquinas says about bodily defects would satisfy many contemporary disability theorists, it seems to me that parts of his accout—and not least this normalization strategy—may appeal to more theologically-inflected accounts of the human condition.

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Disability and Resurrection Identity

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Disabled Bodies on Earth and in Heaven

Disabled Bodies on Earth and in Heaven

Surgery and Selfhood in Early Modern England

Aquinas on Physical Impairment: Human Nature and Original Sin

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