Disabilities Are Also Legitimately Medically Interesting Constraints on Legitimate Interests

Abstract

What is it for something to be a disability? Elizabeth Barnes, focusing on physical disabilities, argues that disability is a social category. It depends on the rules undergirding the judgements of the disability rights movement(s). Barnes' account may strike many as implausible. I articulate the unease, in the form of three worries about Barnes' account. It does not fully explain why the disability rights movement is constituted in such a way that it only picks out paradigmatic disability traits, nor why only the traits identified by the movement as constituting experiences of social and political constraint count as disability. It also leaves out the contribution of people other than disability activists, to the definition of disability. I develop Barnes' account. On my account, a person is disabled if she is in some state which is constitutive of some constraint on her legitimate interests. This state must be the subject of legitimate medical interest, and be picked out by the disability rights movement(s) as among the traits they are seeking to promote progress and change for. My account addresses the worries about Barnes' account. It is also able to include all disabilities, rather than only physical ones.

Defining disability and the role of the disability and the medical communities

“…A person, S, is disabled in context C, if and only if: S is in some state, x; x is constitutive, in C, of some constraint on S's legitimate interests; x is regarded, in C, as the subject of legitimate medical interest; The rules employed by the disability rights movement classify x in C as among the traits that they are seeking to promote progress and change for (Lim, 2018: 987). …”

“…The intention behind (III) is to accommodate conditions that the medical community is legitimately interested in. Contrary to Barnes', Lim's account aims at categorising certain traits as disabilities even “when those traits do not present primarily, or even obviously, social, or political constraints” (Lim, 2018: 985). To exemplify this, Lim provides the example of polycystic ovary syndrome (POS), a condition that involves irregular menstrual cycles, difficulty getting pregnant, and increased risk of miscarriage (Lim, 2018: 985).…”

“…Contrary to Barnes', Lim's account aims at categorising certain traits as disabilities even “when those traits do not present primarily, or even obviously, social, or political constraints” (Lim, 2018: 985). To exemplify this, Lim provides the example of polycystic ovary syndrome (POS), a condition that involves irregular menstrual cycles, difficulty getting pregnant, and increased risk of miscarriage (Lim, 2018: 985). Lim points out that, although POS does not clearly constitute a social or political constraint (and thus is not picked by disability activists as a condition that they seek to promote progress and change for), we might still have good reasons to consider it a case of disability.…”

“…This renders my account able to account for all disabilities (rather than merely physical ones), and to acknowledge the fact that disability activists may have aims beyond that of promoting justice. (Lim, 2018: 1000)…”

“…In his recent paper, “Disabilities Are Also Legitimately Medically Interesting Constraints on Legitimate Interests,” Lim (2018) presents an account of disability that is a modification and extension of the well‐known account of disability presented by Barnes (2016).…”