Dirty Bomb Risk and Impact

Connell, Leonard W.

doi:10.2172/1378173

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…The simulated radioactive source was Co 60 with a strength of 0.1 and 0.5 Ci, emitting 1.17 and 1.33 MeV gammas. Cobalt 60 was chosen because it is a common nuclear material of concern for dirty bombs [19][20][21]. In the simulations, the source is shielded by 10 cm of lead.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Nuclear Materials in Urban Environments Using Mobile Sensor Networks

Flanagan

Brandt

Osborne

et al. 2021

Sensors

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Radiation detectors installed at major ports of entry are a key component of the overall strategy to protect countries from nuclear terrorism. While the goal of deploying these systems is to intercept special nuclear material as it enters the country, no detector system is foolproof. Mobile, distributed sensors have been proposed to detect nuclear materials in transit should portal monitors fail to prevent their entry in the first place. In large metropolitan areas, a mobile distributed sensor network could be deployed using vehicle platforms such as taxis, Ubers, and Lyfts, which are already connected to communications infrastructure. However, performance and coverage that could be achieved using a network of sensors mounted on commercial passenger vehicles has not been established. Here, we evaluate how a mobile sensor network could perform in New York City using a combination of radiation transport and geographic information systems. The geographic information system is used in conjunction with OpenStreetMap data to isolate roads and construct a grid over the streets. Vehicle paths are built using pickup and drop off data from Uber, and from the New York State Department of Transportation. The results show that the time to first detection increases with source velocity, decreases with the number of mobile detectors, and reaches a plateau that depends on the strength of the source.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detecting Nuclear Materials in Urban Environments Using Mobile Sensor Networks

Flanagan

Brandt

Osborne

et al. 2021

Sensors

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“…For incidents during transit, costs in rural areas are 100 times lower than for a similar incident in cities or other areas of significant economic import. Based on an analysis from Sandia National Laboratories, 25 costs in rural areas are expected to be lower than this assumed cost; however, we use this conservative estimate because it is challenging to predict how a rural incident will affect public perception. 6.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…12,14 In Table 1, we present the values assumed for each of the four factors, which were derived from experimental estimates, predictive models, and historical records of exposure to radioactivity. 25,[29][30][31][32][33][34][35][36][37] Even though the challenges associated with predicting or quantifying risk associated with high-risk, low-probability events cannot be understated, we illustrate that radiological risk costs associated with HLW are considerably less significant compared to other relevant risk factors.…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consolidated nuclear waste storage in Andrews, Texas: An integrated technical and policy risk analysis

Mallette

Krishnamoorti

2021

Energy & Environment

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Over the last 50 years, nuclear energy has reduced US energy-related CO2 emissions by over 30 gigatons compared to if the same electricity were produced by fossil fuels such as coal and natural gas. However, many kilotons of spent nuclear fuel have accumulated at different sites across the country, and sociopolitical factors have frustrated efforts to address the challenge of nuclear waste disposal. Presently, a consolidated interim storage facility in Andrews, Texas, provides a promising temporary solution. In this paper, we compare the technical and policy risks of the project to continued storage at independent spent fuel storage installations. Our results indicate that the cost of the radiological risk is low (<$30,000) for both scenarios. However, policy and societal considerations will impact the viability of the proposed consolidated interim storage facility. The safety and suitability of this interim storage facility will be affected by when a permanent repository becomes available, whether insurance for offsite waste storage is available, and the impact of climate risks. Although a consolidated interim storage facility at Andrews can potentially serve as a safe and economically advantageous solution, we highlight why these concerns must be addressed for the successful implementation of this facility, and more broadly for the future of the US nuclear industry.

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“…Depending on the specifics of the explosive, the type of radioactive material, and dispersal conditions, persons nearby the event could also suffer radiation exposure. Decontamination of the site may be exceedingly costly and lengthy (1,2,4–6). Simulations comparing unmitigated and mitigated release of 10 kg of weapons‐grade plutonium, requiring mitigation of 9 km 2 of land v. only the immediate area, respectively, reflected a remediation cost differential of approximately a 100‐fold (7).…”

Section: Figmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Simulations comparing unmitigated and mitigated release of 10 kg of weapons‐grade plutonium, requiring mitigation of 9 km 2 of land v. only the immediate area, respectively, reflected a remediation cost differential of approximately a 100‐fold (7). In any case, the threat is real and dispersion of even a small amount of radioactive material by a “dirty bomb” would aptly serve the terrorist goals of inciting widespread fear and panic of the public, with long‐enduring negative economic effects (2,4,8–10).…”

Section: Figmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blast Suppression Foam, Aqueous Gel Blocks, and their Effect on Subsequent Analysis of Forensic Evidence*

Monson

Kyllonen²,

Leggitt

et al. 2020

Journal of Forensic Sciences

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In addition to having blast mitigation properties, aqueous foam concentrate AFC-380 blast suppression foam is designed to capture aerosolized chemical, biological, and radioactive particles during render-safe procedures of explosive devices. Exposure to aqueous environments and surfactants may negatively affect forensic evidence found at the scene, but the effects of AFC-380 foam and aqueous gel on the preservation and subsequent analysis of forensic evidence have not previously been investigated. Sebaceous finger and palm prints and DNA samples on paper, cardboard, tape, and various metal and plastic items, along with hairs, carpet and yarn fibers, and inks and documents, were exposed to AFC-380 foam. Similar mock evidence was also exposed to a superabsorbent gel of the type found in aqueous gel blocks used for shrapnel containment. Exposure to foam or aqueous gel was associated with a dilution effect for recovered DNA samples, but quality of the samples was not substantially affected. In contrast, exposure to AFC-380 foam or gel was detrimental to development of latent finger and palm prints on any substrate. Neither the hair nor the fiber samples were affected by exposure to either the foam or gel. Indented writing on the document samples was detrimentally affected by foam or gel exposure, but not inks and toners. The results from this study indicate that most types of forensic evidence recovered after being exposed to aqueous gel or blast suppression foam can be reliably analyzed, but latent finger and palm prints may be adversely affected.

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Dirty Bomb Risk and Impact

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Detecting Nuclear Materials in Urban Environments Using Mobile Sensor Networks

Detecting Nuclear Materials in Urban Environments Using Mobile Sensor Networks

Consolidated nuclear waste storage in Andrews, Texas: An integrated technical and policy risk analysis

Blast Suppression Foam, Aqueous Gel Blocks, and their Effect on Subsequent Analysis of Forensic Evidence*

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