Directors with supply chain experience as heterogeneous network pipes: how does it affect M&A efficiency

Abstract

PurposeThe link between interlocking directors and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) efficiency has been analyzed in an information asymmetry environment. Despite an abundance of evidence highlighting that interlocking directors do contribute to M&A efficiency in an acquirer-target binary relationship, the target is embedded in a complex network of supplier-customer relationships, which implies that the acquirer needs to consider the value of suppliers, distributors and retailers in the target’s supply chain in improving M&A efficiency. Through the lenses of acquirer-target multivariate relationships, this paper aims to examine how directors with supply chain experience (DSCs) act as heterogeneous network pipes to affect M&A efficiency.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of 311 A-share listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in China during 2011–2020, this paper investigates the relationship between DSCs and M&A efficiency by using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.FindingsThrough empirical research, we verify a negative relationship between DSCs and M&A duration and an inverted U-shaped relationship between both DSCs and M&A performance, revealing the complexity of the relationship between experience and efficiency. Furthermore, drawing on upper echelon theory, the information value of DSCs will be greatly reduced when executives have overconfident psychological characteristics, which are mainly shown to negatively moderate the relationship between DSCs and M&A performance. We also conduct multiple robustness tests and supplemental analyses to illustrate the robustness and boundaries of our findings. Finally, DSCs are likely more important in environments among growth and mature firms as well as high-growth industries.Originality/valueWe break through the assumption that interlocking directors contribute to M&A efficiency in an acquirer-target binary relationship and examine the impact of DSCs on M&A efficiency based on micro-empirical evidence from the value of target-related upstream or downstream industries, which extends the connotation of interlocking directors and enriches the study related to factors influencing M&A efficiency.