Direct and Indirect Treatment Effects–Causal Chains and Mediation Analysis with Instrumental Variables

Frölich, Markus; Huber, Martin

doi:10.1111/rssb.12232

Cited by 80 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…6 Note that Eg α(x, s 1 (w), 1), is generally not equal to ψ(x, s 1 (w), 1) because and s 1 (w) are dependent. 7 A similar decomposition is studied by Frölich, M. and Huber, M. (2014) [25].…”

Section: Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 93%

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Multiple Discrete Endogenous Variables in Weakly-Separable Triangular Models

Jun

Pinkse

et al. 2016

Econometrics

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We consider a model in which an outcome depends on two discrete treatment variables, where one treatment is given before the other. We formulate a three-equation triangular system with weak separability conditions. Without assuming assignment is random, we establish the identification of an average structural function using two-step matching. We also consider decomposing the effect of the first treatment into direct and indirect effects, which are shown to be identified by the proposed methodology. We allow for both of the treatment variables to be non-binary and do not appeal to an identification-at-infinity argument.

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Section: Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…This example is also considered in [25]. The instrument for d is the educational intervention in the Project STAR experiment, in which early graders were randomized into small classes, and the instrument for s could be the variation in tuition fees or distance to college; see, for instance, [13,26].…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiple Discrete Endogenous Variables in Weakly-Separable Triangular Models

Jun

Pinkse

et al. 2016

Econometrics

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“…This is somewhat similar to the framework inFrölich and Huber (2017), where the identification of causal models that allow the presence of an endogenous "mediator" variable was investigated. In our model, D2 may be regarded as the mediator of D1.…”

mentioning

confidence: 90%

Treatment Eﬀect Models with Strategic Interaction in Treatment Decisions

Hoshino

Yanagi

2018

SSRN Journal

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We develop identification and estimation methods for treatment effect models with strategic interaction in the treatment decisions. We consider models where one's treatment choice and outcome can be endogenously affected by others' treatment choices. We formulate the interaction of the treatment decisions as a two-player complete information game with potential multiple equilibria. For this model, using a latent index framework and the assumption of a stochastic equilibrium selection rule, we prove that the marginal treatment effect from one's own treatment and that from his/her partner's can be separately point-identified with potential over-identifiability. Based on our constructive identification results, we propose a two-step semiparametric procedure for estimating the marginal treatment effects using series approximation. The proposed estimator is shown to be uniformly consistent and asymptotically normal. As an empirical illustration, we investigate the impacts of risky behaviors on adolescents' academic performance.1 To the best of our knowledge, few studies address treatment evaluation in the presence of strategic interaction, where the treatment decisions are explicitly modeled as games. One important exception is Balat and Han (2018), who mainly investigate the partial identification of average treatment effects (ATE). Thus, our main parameters of interest (MTE) are different from theirs (ATE). In addition, the key identification assumptions in Balat and Han (2018) are shape restrictions on the conditional mean outcome functions, while we mainly rely on a stochastic equilibrium selection rule, as stated below.2 As another related work, Mogstad et al. (2019) introduce partial monotonicity to deal with issues due to multiple instruments. However, partial monotonicity is not designed for settings with multivalued or multidimensional treatments such as our situation.

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“…the electoral system works, inter alia, through the alignment channel, it is impossible to clearly distinguish between the direct and the indirect effects of the electoral system, without referring to an exogenous instrumental variable as a mediator (see,Frölich and Huber, 2017, for more details). Further details on the empirical investigations into the channel of transmission are given in section 5.2.For the RD design, some assumptions must be made, in order to identify the local treatment effect.…”

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confidence: 99%

Disentangling the fiscal effects of local constitutions

Kantorowicz

Köppl‐Turyna²

2019

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We apply a regression discontinuity design to verify how constitutional rules, such as electoral systems, shape budget revenues at the subnational governmental level. We take advantage of a natural experiment involving an institutional reform at the local level in Poland. The reform introduced two electoral rules, which changed according to an exogenous population threshold: smaller municipalities used majoritarian elections and larger municipalities used proportional elections. While intergovernmental grants increased in both small and large municipalities, they increased less in municipalities with majoritarian elections compared to jurisdictions with proportional representation. This has further implications regarding the level of property taxes and vertical fiscal imbalance. The jurisdictions with proportional electoral systems had lower revenues from property taxes and higher vertical fiscal imbalance than jurisdictions with majoritarian systems. We show that this effect works through the alignment channel, which is driven by the political alignment of mayors with parties in the central government. This is more prevalent in proportional election scenarios. We also demonstrate that these effects are more pronounced in the period after 2002, when direct elections of mayors were introduced.

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Direct and Indirect Treatment Effects–Causal Chains and Mediation Analysis with Instrumental Variables

Cited by 80 publications

References 41 publications

Multiple Discrete Endogenous Variables in Weakly-Separable Triangular Models

Multiple Discrete Endogenous Variables in Weakly-Separable Triangular Models

Treatment Eﬀect Models with Strategic Interaction in Treatment Decisions

Disentangling the fiscal effects of local constitutions

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