Differentiated Containment

Brzeziński, Zbigniew; Scowcroft, Brent; Murphy, Richard F.

doi:10.2307/20048029

Cited by 24 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…133 It was suggested that the policy was "shot through with logical fl aws and practical inconsistencies" and was "based on faulty geopolitical premises," since it was "hard to see how either Iraq or Iran could be contained, in the administration's sense, without the cooperation of its hostile counterpart." A major debate arose over the viability of implementing the policy simultaneously, since "containment of Iran requires a relatively strong and unifi ed Iraq on its long western border .…”

Section: Iran Iraq and Dual Containmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking charge and taking stock

2015

Clinton’s Grand Strategy

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Section: Iran Iraq and Dual Containmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taking charge and taking stock

2015

Clinton’s Grand Strategy

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“…198 Not surprisingly, the lobby worked actively in Congress to save the policy. 199 Pressed by AIPAC and other pro-Israel forces, Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran. But AIPAC and company wanted more.…”

Section: Dreams Of Regional Transformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent for Ha'aretz, noted at the time, "Israel is but a tiny element in the big scheme, but one should not conclude that it cannot influence those within the Beltway." 200 By the late 1990s, however, the neoconservatives were arguing that dual containment was not enough and that regime change in Iraq was now essential. By toppling Saddam and turning Iraq into a vibrant democracy, they argued, the United States would trigger a far-reaching process of change throughout the Middle East.…”

Section: Dreams Of Regional Transformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

2006

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At the suggestion of several wellrespected scholars who had read earlier drafts, we also posted a slightly longer and documented version of the article on the Working Paper website of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. We did this so that interested parties could see the sources and evidence on which our conclusions were based.The response to the two versions of the paper was dramatic. As of mid-July 2006, there had been over 275,000 downloads of the KSG Working Paper version, and a lively (albeit not always civilized) debate was underway. During this period, we were contacted by the editor of Middle East Policy, who sought to publish the documented version. We agreed but asked that we be allowed to revise the Working Paper in response to the comments and criticisms it had provoked.After considering the responses to our article, we stand by our original arguments. We knew that it would attract criticism, but we have been struck by how weak and illfounded many of the criticisms have been. We have made minor adjustments in some of the language we employed and corrected a few typographical errors. We have supplemented our arguments in several places to clarify issues that some of our critics either misunderstood or misconstrued, and we have updated a few points in light of subsequent events. In terms of its core claims, however, this revised version does not depart from the original Working Paper.We are now preparing a detailed "Response to Our Critics" that will formally address and refute the various charges that were leveled at our original article. And we remain convinced that the United States will not be able to deal with the vexing problems in the Middle East if it cannot have a serious and candid discussion of the role of the Israel lobby.

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“…The sanctions were initiated with the intent of "not trying to change the Iranian regime per se but rather its behavior...," yet the outward behavior of the regime after 24 years has not notably changed. 2 One reason for the sanctions ineffectiveness is their limited impact on Iranian trade.…”

Section: Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Iran: Threat or Opportunity? A Selective Economic Engagement Strategy Proposal

Dooley¹

2004

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Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. This paper summarizes the relations between Iran and the US since the fall of the Shah, the reasons why current containment strategy is not effective, and highlights rising conditions that are conducive to engagement. An engagement strategy centered on selective economic engagement and public diplomacy is proposed, with elaboration of how the strategy can advance US interests. The strategy's potential for success is subsequently analyzed by examining its potential to overcome obstacles to execution and its effectiveness when put into action. Current State of AffairsThe US hostage crisis in 1979 during the overthrow of the Shah effectively brought US

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Differentiated Containment

Cited by 24 publications

References 0 publications

Taking charge and taking stock

Taking charge and taking stock

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

Iran: Threat or Opportunity? A Selective Economic Engagement Strategy Proposal

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