Differential Power Analysis

Abstract

Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines speciaec methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to aend secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

“…In the early 2000s, side channel analysis and fault attacks on smart card platforms were mainly focussed on the cryptographic algorithms [197,207] [211]. However, in the second half of the 2000s, logical and fault attacks were combined to target the JCRE [212] [214].…”

“…Furthermore, fault attacks require knowledge of the underlying platform and application execution pattern [191]. This is possible to achieve by side-channel analysis [197].…”

“…However, the smart card industry responded to this attack vector and implemented adequate protection, which simply make such attacks more di cult to mount. On the other hand, it led to the materialisation of the side-channel analysis that provided an avenue to attack the smart card platform, especially the cryptographic algorithms [197]. Nevertheless, most of the modern smart cards employ both hardware and software mechanisms to counter side-channel analysis.…”

Mathematics under the Microscope

“…Moreover, brain scan techniques where the activities of various parts of the brain are studied by measuring the blood flow (which correlates with the energy consumption) also have an analog in cryptanalysis-namely power trace analysis: the secret key on a credit card is deduced from the pattern of its energy consumption when it is plugged into the card reader [264,307].…”

Language Modeling and Encryption on Packet Switched Networks

“…This has been highlighted in recent years by the discovery of multiple "side-channel attacks" that are very effective against real-world systems, but usually fall outside the scope of existing security models. Examples include algorithmic timing analysis [12], differential power analysis [13], protocol fault analysis [4], and differential fault analysis [3]. There is at least anecdotal evidence that many other side channel attacks exist (e.g., RF and acoustic attacks) for popular models of security.…”