Differential Fault Attack on SKINNY Block Cipher

Vafaei, Navid; Bagheri, Nasour; Saha, Soumen; Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-05072-6_11

Cited by 5 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…By comparing the literature in Table 7 , we can find that the fault injection locations of the DFA method proposed in [ 5 ] and the method used in this paper were both in the 28th round. The number of faults used in [ 5 ] was 10.6; meanwhile, only one fault was needed in this paper to complete the recovery of the master key. There was little difference in time between the two methods, and both completed the attack in a relatively short time.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…The ShiftRows operation performs a cell-wise right-rotation of 0, 1, 2, and 3 cells for the first, second, third, and fourth rows of the internal state. A permutation P is applied on the cells positions of the cipher internal state cell array: for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, the operation can be represented as P = [0, 1,2,3,7,4,5,6,10,11,8,9,13,14,15,12].…”

Section: • Addconstantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…SKINNY is a new lightweight tweakable block cipher that was presented to compete with the SIMON family. Currently, the main research methods for SKINNY-64 include differential analysis, differential fault analysis [ 5 , 6 ], impossible differential analysis [ 7 ], enhanced persistent fault analysis [ 8 ], rectangle attack [ 9 ], and algebraic persistent fault analysis [ 10 , 11 ]. The main idea of differential fault analysis is to analyze the XOR differential between the correct and the corresponding faulty ciphertexts to extract the master key.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The main idea of differential fault analysis is to analyze the XOR differential between the correct and the corresponding faulty ciphertexts to extract the master key. The average number of faults required for the SKINNY-64 block cipher in [ 5 ] was 10.6. Impossible differential analysis is a variant of differential cryptanalysis proposed by Knudsen [ 12 ] and Biham [ 13 ] et al Its main idea was to discard the wrong keys using differentials that hold with a probability of zero.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Efficient Attack Scheme against SKINNY-64 Based on Algebraic Fault Analysis

Fang

Cui

Wang

et al. 2023

Entropy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Lightweight block ciphers are normally used in low-power resource-constrained environments, while providing reliable and sufficient security. Therefore, it is important to study the security and reliability of lightweight block ciphers. SKINNY is a new lightweight tweakable block cipher. In this paper, we present an efficient attack scheme for SKINNY-64 based on algebraic fault analysis. The optimal fault injection location is given by analyzing the diffusion of a single-bit fault at different locations during the encryption process. At the same time, by combining the algebraic fault analysis method based on S-box decomposition, the master key can be recovered in an average time of 9 s using one fault. To the best of our knowledge, our proposed attack scheme requires fewer faults, is faster to solve, and has a higher success rate than other existing attack methods.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: • Addconstantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Efficient Attack Scheme against SKINNY-64 Based on Algebraic Fault Analysis

Fang

Cui

Wang

et al. 2023

Entropy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The theoretical complexity estimates of all the proposed attacks have also been validated by extensive simulation experiments on software implementations of SKINNY. An initial version of this work has been presented in SPACE 2018 [35] where we have presented DFA attacks on SKINNY variants with a fixed tweak. In this extended version, we propose the attacks with variable tweaks along with their simulated validation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fault Attack on SKINNY Cipher

et al. 2020

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

SKINNY is a family of tweakable lightweight block ciphers, proposed in CRYPTO 2016. The proposal of SKINNY describes two block size variants of 64 and 128 bits as well as three options for tweakey. In this paper, we present fault attacks (FA) on all SKINNY variants. In the first part of the paper, we propose differential fault analysis (DFA) attacks on SKINNY variants keeping the tweak fixed. The attack model of tweakable block ciphers allows the access and full control of the tweak by the attacker. Respecting this attack model, we assume a fixed tweak for the attack window. With this assumption, extraction of the master key of SKINNY requires about 10 random nibble fault injections on average for 64-bit versions of the cipher, whereas the 128-bit versions require roughly 21 byte-fault-injections. In the later part of this work, we relax this assumption and perform fault attacks under known but randomly varying tweaks. It is found that pairs of bit faults at the input and output of the S-Boxes allow complete key recovery under random tweak. Moreover, explicit access to ciphertexts is not required in our attack, and key recovery is possible only by knowing if the ciphertext is correct or faulty. This property of the attack allows key recovery even at the presence of simple redundancy-based FA countermeasures. Both the DFA and paired fault-based attacks were validated through extensive simulation. To the best of authors' knowledge, these are the first instances of FAs reported on SKINNY tweakable block cipher family.

show abstract