Differential decision analysis of transboundary pollution considering the participation of the central government

Abstract

In response to the failure of traditional administrative methods to manage transboundary polluted areas, this study uses Stackelberg game theory to construct a three‐party dynamic game model from the perspective of government participation. The results show that the central government will only subsidize local governments when the environmental benefits obtained reach a certain threshold, prompting the local governments to increase pollution control efforts to improve environmental benefits. From the perspective of pollutant emission reduction and environmental benefits, the collaborative governance model is superior to both spontaneous governance and the central government‐led model. Finally, the validity of the conclusion is verified.

Research on the Supervision Mechanism and Effect of Environmental Regulation – Re-Estimation Based on China’s Corn Planting Fertilizer Pollution

“…According to the theory of environmental decentralization, relying solely on the government for regulation will produce ˮregulation captivesˮ, so it is necessary to monitor the government's environmental regulation behavior. Jia F. et al (2021) uses the principal-agent model to analyze the tripartite game between central government regulation, local government regulation and enterprise pollution behavior, and explains the necessity of environmental supervision with the information asymmetry theory [36]. This paper constructs a theoretical model to analyze the relationship between environmental supervision, environmental regulation and pollution from the perspective of risk.…”