Differential and linear cryptanalysis for 2-round SPNs

Chun, Kilsoo; Kim, Seungjoo; Lee, Sang-Jin; Sung, Soo Hak; Yoon, Seonhee

doi:10.1016/s0020-0190(03)00333-8

Cited by 15 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…This result has then been refined in [9,21,8]. The bounds in [15,9,21] are invariant under affine equivalence, i.e., their values are the same for two Sboxes S and S when there exist two affine permutations A 1 and A 2 such that S = A 1 •S•A 2 .…”

Section: Expected Probability Of a 2-round Differentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The bounds in [15,9,21] are invariant under affine equivalence, i.e., their values are the same for two Sboxes S and S when there exist two affine permutations A 1 and A 2 such that S = A 1 •S•A 2 . However, the exact values of MEDP 2 may differ for Sboxes in the same equivalent class, and there can be a gap between these bounds and the exact value of MEDP 2 .…”

Section: Expected Probability Of a 2-round Differentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Differential Attacks Against SPN: A Thorough Analysis

Canteaut

Roué

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. This work aims at determining when the two-round maximum expected differential probability in an SPN with an MDS diffusion layer is achieved by a differential having the fewest possible active Sboxes. This question arises from the fact that minimum-weight differentials include the best differentials for the AES and several variants. However, we exhibit some SPN for which the two-round MEDP is achieved by some differentials involving a number of active Sboxes which exceeds the branch number of the linear layer. On the other hand, we also prove that, for some particular families of Sboxes, the two-round MEDP is always achieved for minimum-weight differentials.

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Section: Expected Probability Of a 2-round Differentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Expected Probability Of a 2-round Differentialmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Attacks Against SPN: A Thorough Analysis

Canteaut

Roué

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…From DDT table, when input difference is 1011(B), output difference 0010(2) occurs eight times with probability 8/16 as we have 16 possible combinations. So, we get probability 8/16 from round 1 [9]. Output of round 1 is fed as input to the round 2.…”

Section: Constructing Differential Characteristicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Cryptanalysis on Block Ciphers: New Research Directions

Tiwari¹,

Garg²,

Singh³

2017

IJCA

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Differential Cryptanalysis is a powerful technique in cryptanalysis, applied to symmetric-key block ciphers. It is a chosen plain-text attack which means the cryptanalyst has some sets of the plain-text and the corresponding cipher-text pairs of his choice. These pairs of the plain-text are related by a constant difference. Basically it is the study of how differences in input information can affect the resultant difference at the output. In this paper, differential cryptanalysis is applied on substitutionpermutation network and data encryption standards cipher. The survey is based on the analysis of a simple, yet realistically structured, basic Substitution-Permutation Network cipher. Along with this, the paper also presents our contribution in this paper as well as our future research work.

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“…[41,14] Let E be a block cipher of the form SPN(m, t, S, M ) where M is a linear permutation with differential (resp. linear) branch number d (resp.…”

Section: Theorem 1 (Fse 2003 Bounds)mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Behaviors of Affine Equivalent Sboxes Regarding Differential and Linear Attacks

Canteaut

Roué

2015

Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2015

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To cite this version:Anne Canteaut, Joëlle Roué. On the behaviors of affine equivalent Sboxes regarding differential and linear attacks. Abstract. This paper investigates the effect of affine transformations of the Sbox on the maximal expected differential probability MEDP and linear potential MELP over two rounds of a substitution-permutation network, when the diffusion layer is linear over the finite field defined by the Sbox alphabet. It is mainly motivated by the fact that the 2-round MEDP and MELP of the AES both increase when the AES Sbox is replaced by the inversion in F 2 8 . Most notably, we give new upper bounds on these two quantities which are not invariant under affine equivalence. Moreover, within a given equivalence class, these new bounds are maximal when the considered Sbox is an involution. These results point out that different Sboxes within the same affine equivalence class may lead to different two-round MEDP and MELP. In particular, we exhibit some examples where the basis chosen for defining the isomorphism between F m 2 and F2m affects these values. For Sboxes with some particular properties, including all Sboxes of the form A(x s ) as in the AES, we also derive some lower and upper bounds for the 2-round MEDP and MELP which hold for any MDS linear layer.

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Differential and linear cryptanalysis for 2-round SPNs

Cited by 15 publications

References 1 publication

Differential Attacks Against SPN: A Thorough Analysis

Differential Attacks Against SPN: A Thorough Analysis

Differential Cryptanalysis on Block Ciphers: New Research Directions

On the Behaviors of Affine Equivalent Sboxes Regarding Differential and Linear Attacks

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