Different Varieties of Euroscepticism? Conceptualizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non‐Member States

Abstract

Since the late 1990s, much scholarly work has been done in the field of Euroscepticism in terms of mapping and conceptualizing different types of opposition to the process of European integration. But even though studies examining Euroscepticism in the EU are plentiful, the lack of insight into different types of Euroscepticism in non‐Member States is striking: there is very little research which considers the extent to which there are different varieties of Euroscepticism in the European states that have chosen non‐membership of the Union. What is Euroscepticism in these countries, and why are the Icelanders, Norwegians and Swiss so Eurosceptic? The article looks at how Euroscepticism plays out in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. It examines what Euroscepticism is and why it occurs in these countries, using a framework for analyzing Euroscepticism based on the concepts of economic, political, post‐materialist value‐based, right‐wing value‐based, cultural and rural society Euroscepticism.

What Explains Increasing Euroscepticism in Switzerland? A Longitudinal Analysis

“…Constantly on the rise from the 1980s to the early 2010s, the SVP is now the strongest party in Switzerland with more than a quarter of the seats at the Federal Assembly (Swiss Parliament 2016). To a lesser extent, the center-right party Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) also opposes EU membership but is generally open to bilateral agreements with the EU (Skinner 2013). Contrary to other non-EU members (e.g., Norway), Swiss left-wing political parties tend to support an adhesion to the EU (Skinner 2013).…”

“…To a lesser extent, the center-right party Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei (FDP) also opposes EU membership but is generally open to bilateral agreements with the EU (Skinner 2013). Contrary to other non-EU members (e.g., Norway), Swiss left-wing political parties tend to support an adhesion to the EU (Skinner 2013). Because of this rightleft divide when it comes to the EU among Swiss political parties, we expect Swiss citizens who subscribe to right-wing ideologies to oppose joining the EU to a greater extent than Swiss citizens with left-wing political ideologies (H3a).…”

“…Indeed, while macro factors such as the 2008 economic crisis undoubtedly played a role in explaining the overall decline in support for joining the EU among Swiss citizens, individual life course changes may also explain why many of them withdrew their support for joining the EU at some point in their life. Literature on Euroscepticism in Switzerland (Christin and Trechsel 2002;Skinner 2013;Theiler 2004) has highlighted how, as they do elsewhere (Hooghe and Marks 2005;Hobolt and de Vries 2016), economic and political/cultural factors shape Swiss citizens' reactions to the EU. Extending this examination, we hypothesize that changes in these factors (e.g., a worsening personal financial situation, political ideologies leaning toward the right) may lead to decline in EU support among Swiss citizens that were initially pro-EU.…”

Good governance and differentiated integration: Graded membership in the European Union

“…Concerns about sovereignty and democracy are common to all refuser countries and cut across the left‐right divide of Eurosceptic parties, which have otherwise different motivations for opposing (full) EU membership (Skinner ). This commonality is generally attributed to the ‘well‐functioning democratic structures’ (Skinner : 135) and ‘successful political legacy’ (Theiler : 640) of these countries.…”

“…Concerns about sovereignty and democracy are common to all refuser countries and cut across the left‐right divide of Eurosceptic parties, which have otherwise different motivations for opposing (full) EU membership (Skinner ). This commonality is generally attributed to the ‘well‐functioning democratic structures’ (Skinner : 135) and ‘successful political legacy’ (Theiler : 640) of these countries. Political Euroscepticism was already dominant in the 1992 Danish referendum on Maastricht (Siune & Svensson ) and is a key component of the 2016 Brexit campaign against the ‘permanent supremacy of EU law’ and the ‘undemocratic, inflexible EU bureaucracy’ .…”