Difference-making grounds

Krämer, Stephan; Roski, Stefan

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0749-5

Cited by 23 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…It also relies on a (modest) epistemic constraint on explanation, unlike my argument in this paper.19 This is a common point(Jackson & Pettit, 1990;Yablo, 1992;Woodward, 2003). The less specific explanation cannot be too unspecific, though(Krämer & Roski, 2017, pp. 1207.…”

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confidence: 72%

“…argues that metaphysical grounding isn't transitive. For replies, see, e.g.,Litland (2013;,Krämer and Roski (2017), and Wygoda Cohen (2020).14 Critical discussions of the allegedly close connection between grounding and explanation includeKovacs (2017) andMaurin (2019).15 Parallel transmission arguments for (E3) can be generated by substituting grounding with certain other metaphysical determination relations in (G1)-(G4).16 Compare Lange (2018) on mixed transitivity, as well asLitland (2018). Securing such an entailment might require modifying the Grounding-Explanation Link in (G3) in some appropriate way.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Normative explanation unchained

Väyrynen

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Gender-based wage discrimination is morally wrong because it is arbitrary. Eating dark chocolate is good for us in virtue of how it is pleasurable and healthy. My hitting my brother was wrong because it was done with the sole intention of causing harm. These are examples of normative explanation: a kind of non-causal explanation of why something is wrong, good, what we ought or have reason to do, or the like. 1 Some kind of further explanation could often go on. For instance, eating dark chocolate is healthy because dark chocolate is a powerful source of antioxidants. Here a question arises: would it follow that eating dark chocolate is good because dark chocolate is a powerful source of antioxidants? The question I mean to ask here is whether the provision of normative explanation transmits downward along such chains of metaphysical determination.1 I'll use 'normative' as shorthand for 'deontic or evaluative'.

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confidence: 72%

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confidence: 99%

Normative explanation unchained

Väyrynen

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…8 This is very similar to the notion irrelevance 2 developed inWoods (1964). As a referee has pointed out, it is also structurally similar to a definition of difference-making in grounding that has been proposed byKrämer & Roski (2017) (inspired by the related idea of difference-making at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020318000382 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core.…”

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confidence: 80%

Relevance for the Classical Logician

Brauer

2018

The Review of Symbolic Logic

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Although much technical and philosophical attention has been given to relevance logics, the notion of relevance itself is generally left at an intuitive level. It is difficult to find in the literature an explicit account of relevance in formal reasoning. In this article I offer a formal explication of the notion of relevance in deductive logic and argue that this notion has an interesting place in the study of classical logic. The main idea is that a premise is relevant to an argument when it contributes to the validity of that argument. I then argue that the sequents which best embody this ideal of relevance are the so-called perfect sequents—that is, sequents which are valid but have no proper subsequents that are valid. Church’s theorem entails that there is no recursively axiomatizable proof-system that proves all and only the perfect sequents, so the project that emerges from studying perfection in classical logic is not one of finding a perfect subsystem of classical logic, but is rather a comparative study of classifying subsystems of classical logic according to how well they approximate the ideal of perfection.

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“…And the truth that snow is white or snow is not white in turn grounds the truth obtained by adding as a further disjunct 1 The pioneering contributions initiating this debate were Batchelor (2010); Correia (2010Correia ( , 2014a; Fine (2010Fine ( , 2012c; Rosen (2010);Schnieder (2011). More recent work includes Correia (2014b);deRosset (2013deRosset ( , 2014; Krämer (2013); Krämer and Roski (2015); Krämer and Roski (2016); Litland (2013Litland ( , 2016a; Poggiolesi (2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The most influential arguments against transitivity are perhaps those given in (Schaffer, 2012: p. 126ff). For replies, see Litland (2013); Raven (2013); Krämer and Roski (2016). 34 We might perhaps also consider allowing the replacement of only some occurrences of P , which would create some additional complications because what modes can be obtained by transitivity from a mode can then not be read off from the corresponding ground-set.…”

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confidence: 99%

Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content

Krämer

2016

Synthese

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This is the penultimate version of an article accepted for publication by Synthese.Please quote only from the published version. The final publication is available at http://link.springer.com ABSTRACT. A lot of research has recently been done on the topic of ground, and in particular on the logic of ground. According to a broad consensus in that debate, ground is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equivalent truths may differ with respect to what grounds them, and what they ground. This renders pressing the question of what we may take to be the ground-theoretic content of a true statement, i.e. that aspect of the statement's overall content to which ground is sensitive. I propose a novel answer to this question, namely that ground tracks how, rather than just by what, a statement is made true. I develop that answer in the form of a formal theory of groundtheoretic content, show how the resulting framework may be used to articulate theories of ground, including in particular an attractive account of the grounds of truthfunctionally complex truths that has proved difficult to accommodate on alternative views of content.

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Difference-making grounds

Cited by 23 publications

References 20 publications

Normative explanation unchained

Normative explanation unchained

Relevance for the Classical Logician

Towards a theory of ground-theoretic content

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