Die Sinne und die Wissenschaften Zur Erkenntnistheorie bei Johannes Müller und Ernst Mach

Baatz, Ursula

doi:10.1515/9783050068794-016

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“…Ash (1995, p. 61) noted that Wundt opposed Herbart’s mechanics, preferring to conceive of consciousness as a unified multiplex, and that Ernst Mach, who had at first defended Herbart against Fechner (in the exchange of letters mentioned above), came eventually to criticize the idea that individual Vorstellungen could be used to formulate a theory of the perception of space and form (Ash, 1995, p. 87). But we note that Mach also conceived of Vorstellungen as being useful bridges between raw sensations and abstract concepts and even speculated that a particular part of the brain might be specialized for physiological mediation among Vorstellungen (Baatz, 1992, p. 268). The battle between behaviorists and Gestalt psychologists between 1910 and 1950 was accompanied by almost total neglect of Herbart’s theory, with the behaviorists probably thinking of his work as too “mentalist” and the Gestalt psychologists thinking of his work as too “elementarist.”…”

Section: Herbart’s Reception By 19th-century Experimental Psychologistsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The fate of Herbart's mathematical psychology.

Boudewijnse

Murray²,

Bandomir³

2001

History of Psychology

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In the 30 years following its fullest presentation in 1824, the mathematical psychology of J. F. Herbart (1776-1841) was widely taught and often favorably discussed by scholars such as M. W. Drobisch. However, Herbart's theory received considerable criticism after the introduction of experimentation into psychology by Fechner and Wundt; Ebbinghaus was more friendly toward it. In the period from about 1885 to 1910, with the focus on unconscious processing in Freud's theory and the revival of interest in Herbart's educational theory, one might have expected interest in Herbart's mathematical psychology to rekindle, but this was not the case. The theory remained neglected throughout the 20th century, but it deserves reappraisal at the start of the 21st century.In an earlier article, we (Boudewijnse, Murray, & Bandomir, 1999) focused on the mathematical aspects of the theory of mental events propounded by Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) in Part 1 of Psychologic als Wissenschaft (Psychology as Science; Herbart, 1824/1890). We did not claim to summarize all of

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Section: Herbart’s Reception By 19th-century Experimental Psychologistsmentioning

confidence: 97%