Die politische Steuerung der Verwaltung

Döhler, Marian

doi:10.5771/9783845202815

Cited by 135 publications

(31 citation statements)

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“…staffing, promotion) to agencies (Anderson et al, 2006;Do¨hler, 2007). However, the different reform trajectories suggest that ministries in Norway may delegate more HMR decisions to agencies than in Germany.…”

mentioning

confidence: 94%

“…However, much less attention has been paid to the interplay between ministries and agencies after delegation, although this body of literature is growing (see e.g. Do¨hler, 2007;Gains, 2003;Pollitt, 2006;Verhoest et al, 2010). A key finding of empirical research on this topic is that seemingly similar organizations vary substantially with regard to their de facto autonomy from parent ministries (Laegreid et al, 2012;Pollitt et al, 2004;Verhoest et al, 2004;Yesilkagit and Van Thiel, 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, personnel management is a key domain of public sector reforms in OECD countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Second, control over staffing and promotion is a traditional instrument of parent ministries to control agencies (Do¨hler, 2007). Hence, the ability of agencies to take such decisions without the involvement or prior approval of ministries is a powerful indicator of ministerial interference in agency management.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway: explaining variation in management autonomy across countries and agencies

Bach

2014

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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1 This article reports the results of a comparative analysis of the human resources management (HRM) autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway. Whereas the academic literature largely focuses on ministry-agency relations in countries where agencies have been only recently established, these two countries have a long tradition of delegation to agencies outside ministerial departments. However, although sharing a broadly similar administrative tradition, each country differs with regard to the management reform trajectory. This allows an empirical test to be carried out of the effects of management reforms on HRM autonomy, drawing on survey data. The article also discusses the literature on how task characteristics and formal agency structure supposedly affect agency autonomy and puts these claims to an empirical test. The empirical analysis reveals cross-country differences, a somewhat limited effect of task characteristics, and a clear effect of formal structure on de facto HRM autonomy, especially in the German context.

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confidence: 94%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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The autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway: explaining variation in management autonomy across countries and agencies

Bach

2014

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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“…Bach and Jann 2010): Semi-autonomous agencies (Bundesoberbehörden) have a statutory basis and dominate the agency landscape in terms of total numbers and staff size(Döhler 2007).Legally independent agencies (Anstalten and Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts) also have a statutory basis, yet they differ in terms of their governing structures. The criterion for inclusion is the mode of selection of the agency head: All agency heads selected by the federal government or the parent minister are included, whereas agency heads appointed by a governing board are excluded.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Determinants of Promotion to High Public Office in Germany: Partisan Loyalty, Political Craft, or Managerial Competencies?

Bach

Veit

2017

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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The politicization of bureaucracy is a widespread strategy to increase the political control of ministerial departments in parliamentary democracies. It is, however, largely unknown why executive politicians promote some officials rather than others to high public office. Based on a unique dataset of all senior officials in German federal ministries and agencies that held office in the period 1997-2015, this article investigates whether partisan loyalty, political craft, and managerial competencies influence the chance of promotion to the highest civil service position in Germany (state secretary). We apply event history modelling to draw inferences on the relative importance of different selection criteria used by ministers when recruiting state secretaries from a candidate pool of senior officials. A key finding is that ministers consistently prefer politically loyal to non-loyal candidates. Although ministers also consider candidates' political craft and selected managerial competencies, they are likely to trade-off partisan loyalty against those qualifications. The article contributes to the literature on politicization in the public sector by comparing potential and actual office holders and by including a broad set of selection criteria, moving beyond the literature's dominating focus on partisan loyalty. The methodological approach developed in this article may well be transferred to other institutional contexts and used for comparative studies in this area.

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“…However, the German energy law contains some restrictions for the ministry since these instructions (which are the teeth of oversight because they force the agency to follow the preferences of the ministry) have to be published and substantiated. This is quite an exceptional provision in German law and unusual in other policy fields (Döhler 2007). Furthermore, many decisions of the BNetzA are made in so-called ruling chambers, which make decisions in a quasi-judicial procedure and are hardly accessible for intervention by the ministry (ibid.).…”

Section: The Federal Network Agencymentioning

confidence: 98%

Agencies between two worlds: information asymmetry in multilevel policy-making

Ruffing¹

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

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European co-ordination is pivotal for an effective regulation of the common market, and European administrative networks are currently mushrooming. Recent quantitative empirical research reveals that national agencies are gaining policy autonomy from their parent ministries when they become involved in European networks. However, the quantitative approach has only partially elucidated the causal mechanisms of this effect. To close this gap, this article examines two fields with dense European administrative networks: financial market regulation and energy regulation. It demonstrates that involvement in European networks exacerbates information asymmetries (particularly those regarding so-called negotiation knowledge) between agencies and their parent ministries. These information asymmetries aggravate ministries' control problems and can even be strategically exploited by agencies, which has far-reaching consequences for the process of multilevel coordination.

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Die politische Steuerung der Verwaltung

Cited by 135 publications

References 0 publications

The autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway: explaining variation in management autonomy across countries and agencies

The autonomy of government agencies in Germany and Norway: explaining variation in management autonomy across countries and agencies

The Determinants of Promotion to High Public Office in Germany: Partisan Loyalty, Political Craft, or Managerial Competencies?

Agencies between two worlds: information asymmetry in multilevel policy-making

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