Die christlich-liberale Koalition als Nutznießer der Föderalismusreform?

Reus, Iris; Zohlnhöfer, Reimut

doi:10.1007/978-3-658-05213-3_11

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2016

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Cited by 8 publications

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“…Germany tried to weaken the veto power of the Bundesrat, but did not want to abolish it. The evidence on the extent of weakening is also rather nuanced (Reus & Zohlnhöfer ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional veto players and cabinet formation: The veto control hypothesis reconsidered

Eppner

Ganghof

2016

European J Political Res

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Are potential cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minority vetoes? Existing evidence for a causal effect of veto control has been weak. This article presents evidence for this effect on the basis of conditional and mixed logit analyses of government formations in 21 parliamentary and semi‐presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012. It also shows that the size of the effect varies systematically across political‐institutional contexts. The estimated causal effect was greater in countries that eventually abolished the relevant veto institutions. It is suggested that the incidence of constitutional reform is a proxy for context‐specific factors that increased the incentives for veto control and simultaneously provided a stimulus for the weakening of institutional veto power.

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“…Germany tried to weaken the veto power of the Bundesrat, but did not want to abolish it. The evidence on the extent of weakening is also rather nuanced (Reus & Zohlnhöfer ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%