Did the 2017 Tax Reform Discriminate against Blue State Voters?

Abstract

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Risk Sharing in a Politically Divided Monetary Union

“…As before, we begin with an examination of the country as a whole, then we look separately at Blue, Red, and Swing states. The political division is likely to be particularly important in examining the fiscal channel: Altig et al (2019) document the differential effects of the 2017 tax reform on Blue states and Red states; and Levitt and Snyder (1995) show that political parties can alter the geographic distribution of Federal appropriations, while (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1985) show that such appropriations are related to prevailing economic conditions. Additionally, Carlino et al (2021) show that the downstream, within-state effect of Federal expenditures is influenced by the political party dominating the individual state.…”

The Marginal Net Taxation of Americans’ Labor Supply

“…These policies are listed in table 1. Detailed TFA documentation is available at Kotlikoff (2019). To abstract from preferences, TFA assumes that households smooth their living standards, defined as discretionary spending per household member adjusted for economies in shared living and the relative cost of children, to the maximum extent possible without borrowing (or, if already indebted, additional borrowing).…”

C and S Corporation Banks: Did Trump's Tax Reform Lead to Differential Effects?

“…Dowd et al (2020) analyze intertemporal responses to the TCJA. Finally, Altig et al (2020) estimate the differential effect of the deductibility of state and local taxes on red-and blue-state voters. Red-state voters seem to gain more.…”