Dictatorship, democracy and corruption in Chile

Pollack, Benny; Matear, Ann

doi:10.1007/bf00572516

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Corruption or anticorruption is so malleable by the ruling class that Tillman (2009) found that behind scandals at companies like Enron and WorldCom were strategic political actions that created criminogenic institutional frameworks, which facilitated acts of corporate corruption. Anticorruption can also be influenced by the political culture of a particular period and by the political and social context of a society (Dalton, 2005;Johnston, 2008;Pollack & Matear, 1996). It has been contended that the interpretation of corruption in China, such as its antigraft campaigns, is a political process that may pay little regard to realistic indicators; and corruption can be manipulated by those in power to achieve political ends or patronage in the communist regime (Findlay & Chiu, 1989;Lo, 1993b;Ren & Du, 2008).…”

Section: Defining Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Youths’ Views on Corruption Control in China

Jiang

2012

Int J Offender Ther Comp Criminol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It has been asserted that criminal law and common morality are not sufficient terms to describe specific behaviors as corruption because those in power have the capacity to include or exclude certain behavior as a category in the law. Thus, corruption should not be just treated as an objective behavioral category but as a form of social censure. This article reports on a quantitative and qualitative study that collected the views of Chinese youth on the control of corruption in China. It was found that they agreed with the moral-negative judgements behind the censure of corruption, and that bureaucratic forces can be mobilised to punish the corrupt and degrade their status. Mediation analysis discovered that political functions mediate the association between the moral-negative nature and bureaucratic form of the censure of corruption and status degradation of the censured.

show abstract

Section: Defining Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Youths’ Views on Corruption Control in China

Jiang

2012

Int J Offender Ther Comp Criminol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The case of corruption in Chile under Pinochet is particularly striking for that matter. The publicized case reported by the US Senate on Pinochet's Riggs Banks accounts was only part of a more general network of corruption that benefited him, his friends, and family (Pollack and Matear 1997). This revelation, and the subsequent arrest of the general under tax fraud charges, affected Pinochet's image much more than the horrendous human rights abuses committed during the 17 years of his regime.…”

Section: Truth Commissionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dealing With a “New” Grievance: Should Anticorruption Be Part of the Transitional Justice Agenda?

Andrieu¹

2012

Journal of Human Rights

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Often presented as "less serious" than physical violence, and even sometimes used by peace-builders to buy social stability, in the Arab context corruption was one of the main grievances motivating the "revolutions," on a par with joblessness and violations of freedom and other rights. To assuage public opinion, post-transition governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and beyond will have to equally address issues of corruption and the violent crimes, such as torture, committed by the security forces. Such initiatives raise the question of whether transitional justice mechanisms, as tools designed to face a legacy of mass human rights violations, are really adequate to address issues of corruption. Could the mandate of traditional transitional justice measures be modified or broadened so as to include this specific grievance? Or should radically new mechanisms be created to do so? The goal of this article is to map the possible links between transitional justice strategies and the fight against corruption, exploring possible coordination and opportunities for mutual reinforcement between the fields.

show abstract

“…In specific cases in Mainland China, suspects were tortured to death by the investigation team in an attempt to extract a confession. 12 Human rights are not absolute but relative. Human rights and public desire for eradicating corruption should be balanced.…”

Section: The Impact Of Anti-corruption On Human Rights In Hong Kongmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 The censure of corruption can be influenced by the political culture of a particular period and by the political and social context of a society [12][13][14]. It is contended that the interpretation of corruption in China, such as its anti-graft campaigns, is a political process which may pay little regard to realistic indicators.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Restricting loans of money to Hong Kong civil servants: social censure or violation of human rights?

Ngan

2009

Crime Law Soc Change

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Obtaining a loan is an individual's private business and such a right should be free from interference. However, if Government officers obtain a loan from undesirable persons, they may be lured into committing an act which they would not otherwise have done but for the favours having been shown by the lenders. Section 3 of Hong Kong's Prevention of Bribery Ordinance attempts to limit such behaviour of Government officers. Since the power of this provision is draconian, it may possibly violate human rights. This paper attempts to use a Social Censure perspective to explain why this provision was put in place in the 1970s and why it was not repealed in the 1990s in line with the rise of human rights standards in Hong Kong. It argues that the then British colonial government used a high-hand legal code to fight against corruption in the civil service to win its legitimacy in face of the rise of Red China in the 1970s. A review of twenty-one Section 3 cases suggests that most of the loans were not distributed for mere friendship but involved a wide range of culpability. Thus the coercion generated by Section 3 was approved by the masses, resulting in the reinforcement of a draconian but efficient legal provision in the service of the colonial administration.

show abstract

Dictatorship, democracy and corruption in Chile

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Youths’ Views on Corruption Control in China

Youths’ Views on Corruption Control in China

Dealing With a “New” Grievance: Should Anticorruption Be Part of the Transitional Justice Agenda?

Restricting loans of money to Hong Kong civil servants: social censure or violation of human rights?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About