Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition

Genschel, Philipp; Lierse, Hanna; Seelkopf, Laura

doi:10.1080/09692290.2016.1152995

Cited by 50 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…In addition, it appears uncontroversial that open economies with a high degree of capital mobility are more affected than closed ones (Wibbels & Arce, 2003 ; Zucman, 2013 ). Finally, Genschel, Lierse, and Seelkopf ( 2016 ) find that badly governed countries suffer more from tax competition than well governed ones. According to the literature of international taxation, these different effects of tax competition on the state’s autonomy to tax are conditioned by domestic politics and institutions.…”

Section: Contested Concepts: Offshore Finance and State Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

All exclusive: the politics of offshore finance in Mexico

Binder

2019

Review of International Political Economy

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At first sight, Mexico appears to be a textbook example of a state affected by offshore finance. Offshore financial services allow corporations and the wealthy to plan taxes, avoid regulations or to launder money. The literature holds that large, developing, open economies, with geographical proximity to offshore centers and problems of crime and corruption are particularly affected by offshoring. By this logic, we should expect Mexico to show a significant demand for offshore financial services. Yet, new empirical evidence derived from interviews and banking statistics suggests otherwise. Mexican firms and individuals make only limited use of offshore finance. The article explains why. Building on a Weberian notion of the state, the article shows that the historically exclusive nature of Mexico's state concentrates political and economic power such that the onshore economy offers similar rents for economic elites as offshoring. Moreover, in instances where economic actors use offshore services it is driven by banking, not taxation. These findings have two theoretical implications. First, they confirm that institutions matter, though differently than hitherto thought. Second, we must look beyond taxation to include banking into our analyses.

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Section: Contested Concepts: Offshore Finance and State Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

All exclusive: the politics of offshore finance in Mexico

Binder

2019

Review of International Political Economy

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“…For instance, many domestic veto points dampen the negative impact of globalization on tax progressivity (Basinger and Hallerberg, 2004;Ganghof, 2006b). Furthermore, autocracies are less participative in tax competition than democracies (Genschel et al, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘Tax the rich’? The financial crisis, fiscal fairness, and progressive income taxation

Limberg

2019

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Has the financial crisis influenced taxes on the rich? In this article, I argue that crisis countries have raised income tax progressivity because of fiscal fairness considerations. I test this claim by analysing a new data set on top marginal personal income tax (PIT) rates for 122 countries from 2006 to 2014, applying matching methods and a difference-in-differences design. The results show that countries with a financial crisis have increased top PIT rates by 4 percentage points. Furthermore, rising public debt only leads to higher top PIT rates when it is crisis-induced. These findings demonstrate that notions of fiscal fairness can still shape progressive taxation in the 21st century.

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“…&:showVizHome=no#1 establishment of a new "fiscal contract" seems necessary also to address the "dictatorship dilemma", according to which dictators or religious Leviathans can foster their acceptance among the population and electoral representation through new forms of social cooptation (see Genschel et al 2016). Considering these circumstances, the available data strongly suggest that the ways in which "people illuminate the night" (Román and Stokes 2015) and their life will be strongly correlated to the positive introduction of a new fiscal contract and new steering-mechanisms.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Lights of Iraq: Electricity Usage and the Iraqi War-Fare Regime

Cerami¹

2018

SSRN Journal

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Dictators don't compete: autocracy, democracy, and tax competition

Cited by 50 publications

References 40 publications

All exclusive: the politics of offshore finance in Mexico

All exclusive: the politics of offshore finance in Mexico

‘Tax the rich’? The financial crisis, fiscal fairness, and progressive income taxation

The Lights of Iraq: Electricity Usage and the Iraqi War-Fare Regime

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