Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability

Bar-El, Ronen

doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9337-3

Cited by 12 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Non-democratic rulers do not survive by using repression alone. To prevent rebellion, autocrats can also provide economic benefits through reduced taxes, subsidies, and public investment (see, e.g., (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005;Bar-El, 2009;Grossman, 1995;Gwatipedza & Janus, 2018)). As shown by Desai et al (2009), those economic benefits may be strategically complemented by policy concessions.…”

Section: Repression Democracy and Economic Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The effects of economic development on democratic institutions and repression in non-democratic regimes: theory and evidence

Kemnitz

Roessler

2022

Const Polit Econ

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This paper provides a theoretical rationale for the simultaneous use of repression and democratic institutions by a non-democratic government, as is often observed in reality. We find that economic development has different impacts on the levels of repression and democracy, depending on whether it appears in the form of rises in income or in education: A higher income level reduces democracy, whereas more education leads to both more democracy and more repression. These theoretical implications are corroborated by dynamic panel data regressions.

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Section: Repression Democracy and Economic Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Superseding autocratic L necessitates a rebellion. Here, we follow Bar-El (2009) by assuming that the mobilization potential for insurgence increases in the discontent of the general population. However, we extend that approach by positing that not only economic but also political issues matter for dissatisfaction.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of economic development on democratic institutions and repression in non-democratic regimes: theory and evidence

Kemnitz

Roessler

2022

Const Polit Econ

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“…The positive derivative implies that the threshold level of loyalty increases in the level of democracy, which reflects that democratic governments must generate more public support. Furthermore, also fully autocratic governments ( D = 0) must ensure a certain level of loyalty ( ) in the population as they face the threat of revolution [ 51 ].…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Health system efficiency and democracy: A public choice perspective

Roessler¹,

Schmitt²

2021

PLoS ONE

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Due to increasing demand and scarce financial resources for healthcare, health system efficiency has become a major topic in political and scientific debates. While previous studies investigating determinants of health system efficiency focused primarily on economic and social influence factors, the role of the political regime has been neglected. In addition, there is a lack of formal theoretical work on this specific topic, which ensures transparency and logical consistency of arguments and implications. Using a public choice approach, this paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical investigation of the relationships between health system efficiency and political institutions. We develop a simple principal-agent model describing the behavior of a government with respect to investments in population health under different political regimes. The main implication of the theoretical model is that governments under more democratic regimes put more effort in reducing embezzlement of health expenditure than non-democratic regimes. Accordingly, democratic countries are predicted to have more efficient health systems than non-democratic countries. We test this hypothesis based on a broad dataset including 158 countries over the period 1995-2015. The empirical results clearly support the implications of the theoretical model and withstand several robustness checks, including the use of alternative indicators for population health and democracy and estimations accounting for endogeneity. The empirical results also indicate that the effect of democracy on health system efficiency is more pronounced in countries with higher income levels. From a policy perspective, we discuss the implications of our findings in the context of health development assistance.

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“…Regarding the political economy of growth, directed research that combines economic analysis with political economy elements refers to political rivalry as a key element affecting economic performance (e.g. Dixit et al ., ; Acemoglu, ; Bar‐El, ). The effects of political rivalry are generally associated with breaking the balance between political power and economic opportunities, thus negatively affecting the relation between political institutions, redistribution and economic outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Rivalry Effects on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality: A New Political Economy Approach

Sochirca¹,

Afonso

Silva

2016

Metroeconomica

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We propose an endogenous growth model with new political economy elements in order to (1) examine how political incentives affect economic allocations and (2) study the effects of political rivalry on human capital accumulation and income inequality. Focusing on two important policies affecting economic performance—fiscal policy and public investments in human capital accumulation—we find that different political incentives have distinct effects on policies and economic allocations. We also find that political rivalry increases income inequality and reduces economic growth and human capital accumulation through its negative impact on public investments in education, wages and individual learning choice.

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Dictators, development, and the virtue of political instability

Abstract: Dictatorship, Growth, Political stability, Repression, D74, H11, H50, O10, O40,

Cited by 12 publications

References 31 publications

The effects of economic development on democratic institutions and repression in non-democratic regimes: theory and evidence

The effects of economic development on democratic institutions and repression in non-democratic regimes: theory and evidence

Health system efficiency and democracy: A public choice perspective

Political Rivalry Effects on Human Capital Accumulation and Inequality: A New Political Economy Approach

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