Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Contested States

Abstract

Why do conflict-generated diasporas mobilize in contentious and non-contentious ways or use mixed strategies of contention? Why do they channel their homeland-oriented goals through host-states, transnational networks, and international organizations? This book develops a theory of socio-spatial positionality and its implications for the individual agency of diaspora entrepreneurs, moving beyond essentialized notions of diasporas as groups. Individual diaspora entrepreneurs operate in transnational social fields affecting their mobilizations beyond dynamics confined to host-states and original home-states. There are four types of diaspora entrepreneurs—Broker, Local, Distant, and Reserved—depending on the relative strength of their socio-spatial linkages to host-land, on the one hand, and original homeland and other global locations, on the other. A two-level typological theory captures nine causal pathways, unravelling how the socio-spatial linkages of these diaspora entrepreneurs interact with external factors: host-land foreign policies, homeland governments, parties, non-state actors, and critical events or limited global influences. Such pathways produce mobilization trajectories with varying levels of contention and methods of channelling homeland-oriented goals. Non-contentious pathways often occur when host-state foreign policies are convergent with the diaspora entrepreneurs’ goals, and when diaspora entrepreneurs can act autonomously. Dual-pronged contention pathways occur quite often, under the influence of homeland governments, non-state actors, and political parties. The most contentious pathway occurs in response to violent critical events in the homeland or adjacent to it fragile states. This book is informed by 300 interviews and a dataset of 146 interviews with diaspora entrepreneurs among the Albanian, Armenian, and Palestinian diasporas in the UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Kosovo and Armenia in the European neighbourhood.

International politics of migration in times of ‘crisis’ and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic

“…International migration has become a major international security concern, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and continuing attacks in Europe and other parts of the globe (Adamson 2006). As migration links different states through interdependence (Tsourapas 2018;Hollifield and Folley 2022), refugees can be 'weaponized' by the leaders of one state to destabilize another (Greenhill 2010), migration issues could be included in diplomatic bargaining (Adamson and Tsourapas 2019), while transnationalism can increase diaspora agency in conflict processes (Koinova 2021). Given that terrorism was collectively securitized in the EU, refugees and asylum seekers were also collectively considered a 'threat' during the so-called migration 'crisis' in Europe (2015-17).…”

“…Most entry and health controls were lifted for them, including the need to prove COVID-19 vaccination and negative tests. Such measures have been supported by earlier granted visa-free travel into the EU and a Temporary Protection Directive, invoked for the first time (Koinova 2022), as well as permission to work in the EU. The obligation to provide international protection was prioritized over the requirement to protect the national populations from the perceived spread of the virus due to human mobility.…”

Imagining a ‘Jewish atom bomb’, constructing a scientific diaspora

“…Defined by their personal characteristics, social skills, innovative goals, and creative actions, entrepreneurs craft strategies to organize others to participate in action. They are key agents in framing an issue, identifying opportunities, mobilizing resources (social and material), and creatively linking previously unconnected networks ( Brinkerhoff, 2016 ; Hess, 2007 ; Jia, 2021 ; Koinova, 2021 ; Mintrom, 2019 ). In contrast to policy or social entrepreneurs, political entrepreneurs seek to influence the broader political landscape.…”

“…Furthermore, the possibility of engaging in the cultivation and mobilization of a scientific diaspora is not readily available to all political entrepreneurs. Rather, it depends on their socio-spatial positionality , meaning the power that these entrepreneurs amass, or are perceived to amass, from their specific social and spatial context as well as their linkages to other global contexts ( Koinova, 2012 , 2017 , 2018b , 2021 ). Engaging in transnational mobilization means that political entrepreneurs must possess social and spatial opportunities to act transnationally.…”

Going after the family: Transnational repression and the proxy punishment of Middle Eastern diasporas

“…Research over the past several decades has brought attention to diasporas as global actors who influence home‐country affairs (Adamson, 2013, 2016; Brinkerhoff, 2009, 2016; Koinova, 2021; Shain, 2005; Smith & Stares, 2007; Vertovec, 2009), and exiles, émigrés, and emigrants who gain new rights and liberties in their countries‐of‐settlement have the potential to fuel socio‐political change at home in a number of ways. By forming transnational advocacy networks dedicated to supporting victims of regime abuses, diaspora movements have the potential to threaten authoritarian rulers’ legitimacy, stability, and even sovereignty (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Moss, 2022).…”