Dialogical Features of Presumptions: Difficulties for Walton’s New Dialogical Theory

Bodlović, Petar

doi:10.1007/s10503-017-9431-0

Cited by 4 publications

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“…This version of the SST is certainly inspired by Walton's remarks, but it is difficult to estimate whether it fully represents his view. At least two factors make the estimation difficult-first, Walton's account of the similarity lacks detailed elaboration and, second, his notion of presumption has changed over the years (for a survay, seeBodlović 2017). Hence, the present analysis does not directly focus on criticizing Walton's original view.…”

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Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

Bodlović

2019

Argumentation

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By explaining the argument from ignorance in terms of the presumption of innocence, many textbooks in argumentation theory suggest that some arguments from ignorance might share essential features with some types of presumptive reasoning. The stronger version of this view, suggesting that arguments from ignorance and presumptive reasoning are almost indistinguishable, is occasionally proposed by Douglas Walton. This paper explores the nature and limits of the stronger proposal and argues that initial presumptions and arguments from ignorance are not closely connected. There are three main reasons. First, the argument from ignorance, unlike typical presumptive reasoning, is a negative kind of inference. Second, the typical initial presumption is sensitive to a broader set of defeaters and thus assumes a higher (negative) standard of acceptability. Third, in dialectical terms, initial presumption and argument from ignorance bring different attacking rights and obligations. I conclude that Waltonian intuition is unsupported or, at best, is limited only to practical presumptions and practical arguments from ignorance.

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Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

Bodlović

2019

Argumentation

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“…[T]he presumption of innocence … is considered a paradigmatic example of presumption among most argumentation scholars (Bodlović, 2017: 516)…”

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Putting the ‘presumption’ back in the ‘presumption of innocence’

2022

The International Journal of Evidence & Proof

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This article tackles the question: can the Presumption of Innocence (PoI) be a presumption? Whereas many criminal law theorists rejection such a notion, I draw inspiration from argumentation theorists and philosophers—in particular, Petar Bodlović and Edna Ullmann-Margalit—and argue in favour of it; indeed, argumentation theory often holds the PoI out as a paradigmatic presumption. My argument proceeds in three sections. I first show that criminal law theorists writing on the PoI have understood presumptions as evidentiary devices in the form of a modus ponens. On that understanding, the PoI cannot be a presumption. Attention is then drawn to the field of argumentation theory, which teaches us that there are other types of presumptions that are non-evidentiary, not in the form of a modus ponens, require a tentative commitment to q, and require an agent to proceed (act) as if q; viz practical presumptions. The PoI can be understood as such. Finally, it is argued that the PoI, insofar as it requires a tentative commitment to q (here, ‘the defendant is innocent’), can be thought of as a propositional imagining of q (ie, an agent presuming innocence is to propositionally imagine the defendant's innocence).

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On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

Bodlović

2020

Argumentation

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The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions (guiding decisions vs. acquiring information), and promote different kinds of goals (non-epistemic vs. epistemic). Accordingly, there are "practical" and "cognitive" presumptions. In this paper, I show that the differences between practical and cognitive presumptions go far beyond contextual considerations. The central aim is to explore Nicholas Rescher's contention that both types of presumptions have a closely analogous pragmatic function, i.e., that practical and cognitive presumptions are made to avoid greater harm in circumstances of epistemic uncertainty. By comparing schemes of practical and cognitive reasoning, I show that Rescher's contention requires qualifications. Moreover, not only do practical and cognitive presumptions have distinct pragmatic functions, but they also perform different dialogical functions (enabling progress vs. preventing regress) and, in some circumstances, cannot be defeated by the same kinds of evidence. Hence, I conclude that the two classes of presumptions merit distinct treatment in argumentation theory.

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Dialogical Features of Presumptions: Difficulties for Walton’s New Dialogical Theory

Cited by 4 publications

References 14 publications

Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

Presumptions, and How They Relate to Arguments from Ignorance

Putting the ‘presumption’ back in the ‘presumption of innocence’

On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

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