DHS-Voting: A Distributed Homomorphic Signcryption E-Voting

Fan, Xingyue; Wu, Ting; Zheng, Qiuhua; Chen, Yuanfang; Xiao, Xiaodong

doi:10.1007/978-981-15-1304-6_4

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The security of the scheme was not tested properly because it does not verify the signature; it only verifies the encryption part and only a single authority to tally the election result. According to the concept proposed by Zhang et al [26], Fan et al [93] implemented a distributed homomorphic signcryption e-voting scheme called DHS-voting. This scheme can verify the signatures in less time and the election results can be tallied by anyone.…”

Section: Comparison Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Cryptographic Electronic Voting

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A vast number of e-voting schemes including mix-net-based e-voting, homomorphic e-voting, blind signature-based e-voting, blockchain-based e-voting, post-quantum e-voting, and hybrid e-voting have been proposed in the literature for better security and practical implementation. In this paper, we review various e-voting approaches to date. We first compare the structures, advantages, and disadvantages of the different e-voting approaches. We then summarise the security properties of the e-voting approaches in terms of their functional requirements and security requirements. In addition, we provide a comprehensive review of various types of e-voting approaches in terms of their security properties, underlying tools, distinctive features, and weaknesses. We also discuss some practical considerations in the design of e-voting systems. Subsequently, some potential research directions are suggested based on our observations.

show abstract

Section: Comparison Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Cryptographic Electronic Voting

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For meeting the previously mentioned security requirements, some encryption techniques have been popularly applied to e-voting to achieve secure election, such as mix-net [13][14][15][16], blind signature [17][18][19][20][21][22][23], homomorphic encryption [24][25][26][27][28], and secret sharing [29][30][31]. Meanwhile, due to the high overhead, mix-net is hard to be applied for the actual election.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Improved Coercion-Resistant E-Voting Scheme

Hao

Zeng

Chang

2021

Security and Communication Networks

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

E-voting has gradually replaced the traditional voting methods to make it easier for people to conduct an election. Recently, Liu et al. propose an unconditional secure e-voting scheme using secret sharing and k-anonymity. Their scheme achieves correct tallying results without revealing raw voting information. However, in this paper, we observe that Liu et al.’s scheme cannot achieve coercion resistance in e-voting since the voter can prove the content of his ballot to the colluded candidates. Then, we propose an improved e-voting scheme to cover up the ballot of the voter with masked values. In this way, even if the voter colludes with corresponding candidates, he cannot prove which candidate he has voted for. Moreover, comparing with Liu et al.’s scheme, the security analysis shows that our proposed e-voting scheme achieves these security requirements like the coercion resistance, integrity of ballots, privacy of ballots, multiple-voting detection, and fairness. Through performance analysis, the experimental results show that our proposed e-voting scheme has higher time efficiency. Compared with other schemes, our scheme achieves a complete voting process and obtains the correct tallying result without complex computation and intricate communication process.

show abstract