2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.05.005
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Deviations from optimal CEO ownership and firm value

Abstract: a b s t r a c tThe transaction cost theory of managerial ownership and firm value predicts that deviations from optimal managerial ownership reduce firm value. This paper empirically tests the transaction cost theory by studying the relation between deviations on either side of optimal CEO ownership and firm value. We find that both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations reduce firm value. We find that a change in CEO ownership is associated with a higher (lower) abnormal return if it moves the ownership t… Show more

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Cited by 40 publications
(33 citation statements)
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“…Thus, does firms' profitability decrease if the level of working capital moves away from the optimum point? In order to answer this question, this study follows similar procedure of Tong (2008) and Martinez-Sola et al (2013) by including the residuals of the optimum working capital level regression.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Thus, does firms' profitability decrease if the level of working capital moves away from the optimum point? In order to answer this question, this study follows similar procedure of Tong (2008) and Martinez-Sola et al (2013) by including the residuals of the optimum working capital level regression.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The results highlight an incremental contribution of this paper relative to Tong (2008). Tong finds that sales of shares by CEOs demonstrate a pattern consistent with a firm's periodical re-optimization of suboptimal CEO ownership.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 55%
“…They find that the increase in managerial ownership is associated with an increase in corporate performance. Tong (2008) studies the relation between deviations on either side of optimal CEO ownership and firm value. He examines the impact of deviations on Tobin's Q and market reactions around sales and purchases of shares by CEOs, and finds that both above-optimal and below-optimal deviations reduce firm value.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Current studies are focusing on the relationship of CEO ownership and the firm value (Tong, 2007), performance (McClelland, Barker III & Oh, 2012), institutional ownership (Shin, 2005 We also focus on debt since it's also an effective mean of control. Grossman and Hart (1982) suggest that debt is an incentive for the CEO to adopt effective management and choose the right investment decisions; it limits managerial discretion by reducing access to cash flow.…”
Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%