Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological Explanation

Abstract

We typically explain human action teleologically, by citing the action's goal or purpose. However, a broad class of naturalistic projects within the philosophy of mind presuppose that teleological explanation is reducible to causal explanation. In this paper I argue that two recently suggested strategies -one suggested by Al Mele and the other proposed by John Bishop and Christopher Peacocke -fail to provide a successful causal analysis of teleological explanation. The persistent troubles encountered by the reductive project suggest that teleological explanations are irreducible and that the naturalistic accounts of mind and agency should be called into question.Human agents typically act for reasons. At least in part, to be an agent is to direct one's behavior toward particular ends or states of affairs. This is what makes teleological explanation appropriate for the behavior of agents, for teleological explanations explain by specifying an action's goal or purpose; for example, when we say that Jackie went to the kitchen in order to get a glass of wine, we thereby specify the state of affairs at which her action was directed.That human actions can be explained teleologically is undisputed. That such explanations are irreducibly teleological is much more controversial. Many philosophers of mind maintain, implicitly or explicitly, that teleological explanations are but a species of causal explanation. As a first pass, a causal analysis might state that A φ'd in order to ψ iff:195

Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation

“…Rather than the ability to change course, if sufficient reasons apply, I see guidance-control as the ability to maintain course and achieve a goal, in the face of a variety of possible impediments, such as unexpected obstacles in the environment or the actions of other agents. This points to an important property of actions, their teleological character (see Wilson 1989, andSehon 1997). Interestingly, Frankfurt has pointed out this important feature of intentional action in a paper that has been somewhat neglected in the responsibility debate (Frankfurt 1978).…”

Intended and Foreseen Unavoidable Consequences

“…Thus, even in our original cases, something more than the bomber's commitment must explain why she intended the relevant consequence. (Wilson 1989;Sehon 1997) One response is to say that the relevant consequence must be brought about by the sustained guidance of the commitment. In our supposed counterexample, guidance was not sustained.…”

Deviant causal chains and intentional action

“…De a szándékos cselekvés oksági elméletétől idegenkedő filozófusok szintén úgy látják, hogy e nehézség megoldhatatlan, és (természetesen nem kizárólag) ezért az elméletet érdemes inkább elvetni (pl. Frankfurt 1978, Wilson 1989, Ginet 1990, Sehon 2005).…”