Developmental origin of the animate–inanimate distinction.

Abstract

The authors examine recent theoretical perspectives of the development of the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy. From these theoretical views emerge 7 characteristic properties, each related to physical or psychological causality, that distinguish animates from inanimates. The literature is reviewed for evidence of infants' ability to perceive and understand each of these properties. Infants associate some animate properties with people by 6 months, but they do not associate the appropriate properties to the broad category of animates and inanimates until at least the middle of the 2nd year. The authors offer a theoretical proposal whereby infants acquire knowledge about the properties of different object kinds through a sensitive perceptual system and a domain general associative learning mechanism that extracts correlations among dynamic and static features.

Infants perceive human point-light displays as solid forms

“…Moreover, we need to consider the role that specific patterns of motion might play in the formation of these representations. We know that moving objects are generally more salient than static objects, and that some aspects of motion, such as being self-starting and having an irregular path, may be of particular importance for infants' categorisation of animate versus inanimate objects (Opfer, 2002;Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). However, there has been little research examining how more specific aspects of so-called biological motion might allow infants to distinguish between humans and animals.…”

Make the first move: How infants learn about self-propelled objects.

“…Perhaps the least ambiguous of all the motion characteristics displayed by different object kinds is that of self-propulsion or onset of motion, because only animals and people tend to move without some external physical cause (Premack, 1990;Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Despite the potential importance of this cue in delineating different object kinds, there is a dearth of empirical evidence concerning when and how infants learn which things in the world are self-propelled and which are not.…”

Embodied Simulation of Others Being Touched in 1-Year-Old Infants

“…This allowed us to examine in greater detail the extent to which the activation of the sensorimotor system might be specific for humans being touched versus objects being touched. Based on findings that infants have different action expectations concerning humans and nonliving objects (e.g., Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001;Woodward, 1998), we expected a similar differentiation in their sensorimotor system between a human hand versus an object being touched/not-touched.…”

“…Behavioural studies already support the view that infants can distinguish between animate and inanimate agents (e.g., Woodward, 1998). Yet, the psychological basis is theoretically debated (e.g., Legerstee, 1992;Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). The present study contributes to this debate by further clarifying the neurocognitive processes underlying this distinction.…”

“…Answering these questions would deepen our knowledge on the neurocognitive basis of the animate-inanimate distinction early in ontogeny (e.g., Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). Furthermore, it would also demonstrate that infants not only mirror others' actions, but also relate to others' sensory experiences that is a central prerequisite for the development of empathy and social understanding that takes place in the first years of life (e.g., Brownell, 2013;Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013;Eisenberg, 2000;Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992).…”