‘Developmental nationalism?’ Political trust and the politics of large-scale land investment in Magufuli's Tanzania

Abstract

Research on large-scale land investments (LSLIs) can provide valuable insights into the support for developmental nationalism in Tanzania today. 'Developmental nationalism' is 'a creative variant of liberation', which purports to make 'Tanzania great again'. The nationalist turn of late President Magufuli was grounded in political ideology and the selective history of the past that swept him to power. However, there is limited research on how political practice around land investments contribute to trust and support for public institutions. This paper makes two key contributions to scholarship on the political economy of LSLIs. First, we examine the messy politics of LSLIs, the failures in design and implementation, and the rise in local support for developmental nationalism in two rural settings in Tanzania. Second, using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), we identify distinct groups of individuals based on their trust in the President, the ruling party (CCM), the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and support for LSLIs. We define political trust as 'an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government, based on people's normative expectations'.

Infrastructure Nationalism and Political Vulnerability – Examining the Stalled Negotiations Over the Bagamoyo Port Project During Magufuli’s Reign

“…Post-Nyerere economic plans involved a rejection of import-substitution industrialisation (a hallmark of the Arusha Declaration) to embrace export-led development fuelled by trade liberalisation and foreign investments (Aminzade, 2013: 352). Local industries lost their state-financed protective barriers, privatisation of previously state-owned assets became the norm and certain sectors of the economy (extractive industries, real estate) became ‘pillaged’ by the influx of unimpeded speculative capital (Kelsall, 2013: 53; Nkobou and Ainslie, 2021: 385; Shivji, 2012: 112). Whatever gains were made from this process of opening up the economy were reaped by the same small elite who actively pushed for neoliberal reforms (Lofchie, 2014: 23).…”

“…Each presidency from the change to multipartyism onwards witnessed a series of insidious grand corruption cases: Ali Hassan Mwinyi (Ministry of Finance, 2 1993–1994); Benjamin Mpaka (Power Tanzania Ltd., 3 1995); Kikwete (Richmond-Dowans Ltd., 4 2006; Bank of Tanzania, 5 2007; BAE, 6 2007). The conjuncture was thus ripe for a candidate with a clean record, a desire to stare corruption in the face, an apparent disapproval of unfettered capitalism and a drive to restore the state to its proper role as a bastion to defend and uphold the collective will of the Tanzanian people (Komba, 2019; Nkobou and Ainslie, 2021: 379). From his position as a relative outsider to the ruling networks, the former President had more leeway to confront vested interests and informal networks (Sambaiga et al, 2018: 26).…”

“…This article therefore asks: to what extent was Magufuli’s ‘infrastructure nationalism’ (combining elements of state developmentalism, heightened nationalism and authoritarianism) responsible for the collapse of the renegotiations over the BPP’s FA between the Tanzanian state, CMHI and SGRF? This article posits that for as much as the collapse in talks between Tanzania with CMHI/SGRF was down to Magufuli’s ‘infrastructure nationalism’, what this ultimately revealed was Magufuli’s unending need to score political points in order to secure his position in the party and with the popular vote (Nkobou and Ainslie, 2021: 379; Sørreime and Tronvoll, 2020: 1493). In other words, this article will assess the extent to which Magufuli’s cravings for public relations (PR) opportunism triggered by his political vulnerability and weak powerbase as a relative outsider (compared with Lowassa), who arrived at the helm at a time when CCM was facing electoral uncertainty, is what drove him to repeatedly disrupt negotiations over the BPP (Collard, 2021: 13; Poncian, 2019: 84; Sambaiga et al, 2018: 14).…”