Developing the incentivized action view of institutional reality

Abstract

Contemporary discussion concerning institutions focus on, and mostly accept, the Searlean view that institutional objects, i.e. money, borders and the like, exist in virtue of the fact that we collectively represent them as existing. A dissenting note has been sounded by Smit et al. (Econ Philos 27:1-22, 2011), who proposed the incentivized action view of institutional objects. On the incentivized action view, understanding a specific institution is a matter of understanding the specific actions that are associated with the institution and how we are incentivized to perform these actions. In this paper we develop the incentivized action view by extending it to institutions like property, promises and complex financial organisations like companies. We also highlight exactly how the incentivized action view differs from the Searlean view, discuss the method appropriate to such study and discuss some of the virtues of the incentivized action view.

Two Social Dimensions of Expertise

“…We use the Searlean framework as it is the most familiar. Essentially the same argument could have been made using the incentivisation approach (Smit et al, 2011(Smit et al, , 2014, which dispenses with 'deontic powers' in favour of incentives. 15.…”

Money and mental contents

“…One such incentive, could, of course, be a group of people coming together and deliberately assigning a status to some thing, in a way that Searle would describe as collective intentionality assigning something a status function. Smit et al do not set out to deny that people can intend together and thereby give one another reasons to act, only that such collective intentions are necessary for institutions or social facts, or that such collective intentions are ontologically primitive, irreducible to something more familiar (Smit et al 2014(Smit et al , p. 1826.…”

“…Eventually, other people begin to do the same. At some point, this behavior is so widespread that the mackerel tins become money, but "the tins of mackerel 'being money' is no more than the sediment of a simple practice that has stabilized" (Smit et al 2014(Smit et al , p. 1827. Furthermore, their reliance on incentives, beliefs, and desires allows their building blocks to accommodate the mental contents condition we argue is necessary for an adequate account of money.…”

Institutions as dispositions: Searle, Smith and the metaphysics of blind chess

“…It is a legitimate worry, for some authors have indeed proposed the kind of view against which Searle is arguing here, e.g. the ‘incentivized action’ view (Smit, Buekens, & du Plessis, ). In brief, how can we distinguish ‘mere dispositions’ from the kind of deontic powers that are central to Searle's account?…”