Developing Provable Secure M-Commerce Applications

Grandy, Holger; Haneberg, Dominik; Reif, Wolfgang; Stenzel, Kurt H.

doi:10.1007/11766155_9

Cited by 8 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Full details on the abstract model of Cindy as well as the details on the verification of security properties on this abstract level can be found in [10]. The next section describes the approach for verifying an implementation of Cindy running on a mobile phone written in J2ME.…”

Section: The Cindy Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Refinement Method for Java Programs

Grandy

Stenzel

Reif

2007

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We present a refinement method for Java programs which is motivated by the challenge of verifying security protocol implementations. The method can be used for stepwise refinement of abstract specifications down to the level of code running in the real application. The approach is based on a calculus for the verification of Java programs for the concrete level and Abstract State Machines for the abstract level. In this paper we illustrate our approach with the verification of a MCommerce application for buying movie tickets using a mobile phone written in J2ME. The approach uses the interactive theorem prover KIV [1].

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Section: The Cindy Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

A Refinement Method for Java Programs

Grandy

Stenzel

Reif

2007

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Besides the communication protocols of the presented electronic wallet application we already formalized other cryptographic protocols, e.g. the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key authentication protocol and other m-commerce applications [GHRS06].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[Sch01] describes a verification method for ASM refinement based on forward simulation and Dynamic Logic. In [GHRS06] such a refinement is defined and verified for an electronic ticketing application.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The smart cards output the calculated session key in clear, therefore proving secrecy properties would fail for an attacker that can eavesdrop into the outputs of the smart cards. [GHRS06] presents a mobile ticketing application for which a security property is proven that only holds if the attacker can only eavesdrop into but not manipulate certain message transfers.…”

Section: Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The example is not very complicated and only serves as illustration of the kind of applications we are interested in, how our formal model looks like, what type of security properties we want to verify and what proof technique is used. Larger applications we verified are the Mondex case study [SGHR06] and an electronic ticketing application [GHRS06].…”

Section: A Small Examplementioning

confidence: 99%

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Verifying Smart Card Applications: An ASM Approach

Haneberg

Grandy

Reif

et al.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We present a formal model for security protocols of smart card applications using Abstract State Machines [BS03, Gur95] (ASMs) and a suitable method for verifying security properties of such protocols. The main part of this article describes the structure of the protocol-ASM and all its relevant parts. Integrated in the ASM are all relevant aspects of the scenario: The agents participating in the application (static and dynamic aspects), the attacker and the possible communication between all those involved in the application. Our modeling technique enables an attacker model exactly tailored to the application under consideration, instead of only an attacker similar to the Dolev-Yao model.We also introduce a proof technique for security properties of the protocols. Properties are proved in the KIV system using symbolic execution and invariants.Our formal approach is exemplified with a small e-commerce application. We use an electronic wallet to demonstrate the ASM-based protocol model and we also show how the proof obligations of some of the security properties look like.

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Verification of Mondex electronic purses with KIV: from transactions to a security protocol

et al. 2008

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Abstract. The Mondex case study about the specification and refinement of an electronic purse as defined in [SCW00] has recently been proposed as a challenge for formal system-supported verification. In this paper we report on two results.First, on the successful verification of the full case study using the KIV specification and verification system. We demonstrate that even though the hand-made proofs were elaborated to an enormous level of detail we still could find small errors in the underlying data refinement theory as well as the formal proofs of the case study.Second, the original Mondex case study verifies functional correctness assuming a suitable security protocol. We extend the case study here with a refinement to a suitable security protocol that uses symmetric cryptography to achieve the necessary properties of the security-relevant messages. The definition is based on a generic framework for defining such protocols based on abstract state machines (ASMs). We prove the refinement using a forward simulation.

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Developing Provable Secure M-Commerce Applications

Cited by 8 publications

References 25 publications

A Refinement Method for Java Programs

A Refinement Method for Java Programs

Verifying Smart Card Applications: An ASM Approach

Verification of Mondex electronic purses with KIV: from transactions to a security protocol

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