Deterrence Theory and the Implementation of Speed Limits in the American States

Abstract

Despite the ubiquitous nature of these policies, there is disagreement in the literature regarding the direction and size of the impact that speed limits have on traffic-related fatalities. We argue in this paper that the mixed results in previous work may arise because these studies have missed an important component of the implementation of speed limit laws. More explicitly, they have failed to adequately control for the deterrent effect of enforcement and sanctions. We develop the argument that the observed impacts of speed limits will be overly large when the certainty and severity of punishment are not accounted for. We test this assertion in a cross-sectional time series analysis of state-level traffic fatalities from the years 1990-2006 and find that lower speeds do save a significant number of lives. Interestingly, we find that the impact is significantly overestimated for 65-mph limits and significantly underestimated for 70-mph limits when enforcement, penalties, and the interaction of the two are excluded. The results also suggest that fines have a rather modest impact on fatalities unless states employ a sufficient number of troopers to enforce posted limits. In addition to clarifying previous findings related to speed limit policy, therefore, the findings contribute to the general application of deterrence theory by empirically confirming that the importance of sanction severity is dependent on the perceived certainty of punishment. KEY WORDS: speed limits, criminal deterrence, traffic safety, policy implementationIn 1974, the federal government included a provision in the Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act mandating that all states set a 55-mph speed limit on interstate highways. The policy change was eventually touted as a way to not only reduce fuel consumption, but also to decrease traffic fatalities by reducing driver speed. Declining oil prices and mounting public pressure prompted congress to relax the mandate in 1987, and it was repealed altogether in 1995, allowing states to once again set their own limits. Lawmakers in the states responded by raising limits anywhere from 5-20 mph for passenger vehicles. Opponents of higher limits continue to warn that they cause an increase in crashes and fatalities, but recent evidence from Texas and Utah, which are experimenting with an 80-mph limit on some stretches of interstate, suggests that states may adopt even higher limits in the future.Scholars have exploited both the overtime and interstate variation in speed limits in order to assess the efficacy of these policies in reducing traffic fatalities.

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The Political Economy of Traffic Deaths

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