Determining Tolerable Attack Surfaces that Preserves Safety of Cyber-Physical Systems

Cheh, Carmen; Fawaz, Ahmed; Noureddine, Mohammad A.; Chen, Binbin; Temple, William G.; Sanders, William H.

doi:10.1109/prdc.2018.00023

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Finally, from a Dolev-Yao based attacker model, an analyzer provides the possible attacks and check if they are feasible, according to a set of security properties. Cheh et al [6] propose an optimization of [24] by considering physical layer interactions in the attacker model.…”

Section: Integrated Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

PLC Logic-Based Cybersecurity Risks Identification for ICS

Silva

Puys

Thevenon

et al. 2023

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

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In recent years, Informational Technologies (IT) was massively deployed into Industrial Control Systems (ICS) mainly for its economic benefits. However, this new paradigm, converging IT and Operational Technologies (OT), brings new challenges that companies need to face. Historically, ICS had to cope with safety requirements which ensure the protection of people, environment, and assets. Now, ICS must deal with additional threats, coming from cyberattacks, in order to maintain safety. For that purpose, it becomes essential to develop new cybersecurity technologies and methodologies that allow to assess the safety of ICS against cyberattacks.In this paper, we propose a new methodology, based on Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) logic in order to identify cyberattacks that impacts the ICS safety. Our methodology transforms a PLC logic into a finite-state machine that represents the PLC behavior. Then, using this automaton, we identify which modifications in states of sensors and actuators leads to compromising the safety. Finally, we build attack scenarios from these events and the network vulnerabilities. We apply our methodology on a simple example, yet challenging to analyze by hand, and we show how we manage to scale up on a classical example from the control systems domain: the Tennessee Eastman chemical process.

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Section: Integrated Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

PLC Logic-Based Cybersecurity Risks Identification for ICS

Silva

Puys

Thevenon

et al. 2023

Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security

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“…Cheh et al [6] analyzed the safety of railway systems corresponding to different classes of venomous actors based on to their abilities defined in the system access control. Initially, they constructed a hybrid automata that models a railway system, where each attack capability is defined as a pattern that represents its effects when appended to a component in the system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Initially, they defined the zero state by inducing only the attacks that remain dynamically undetectable regardless the available information to the attack detector at the initial state. Cheh et al [6] and Chen et al [7] consider attacks that are initiated when the system starts the execution without showing the impact of each attack action on the behaviour of the system functionality. Further, they do not consider how to overcome them.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing the Severity of Smart Attacks in Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems

Khaled¹,

Ouchani

Tari

et al. 2020

ACM Trans. Cyber-Phys. Syst.

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Industrial cyber-physical systems (<monospace>ICPS</monospace>) are heterogeneous inter-operating parts that can be physical, technical, networking, and even social like agent operators. Incrementally, they perform a central role in critical and industrial infrastructures, governmental, and personal daily life. Especially with the Industry 4.0 revolution, they became more dependent on the connectivity by supporting novel communication and distance control functionalities, which expand their attack surfaces that result in a high risk for cyber-attacks. Furthermore, regarding physical and social constraints, they may push up new classes of security breaches that might result in serious economic damages. Thus, designing a secure <monospace>ICPS</monospace> is a complex task, since this needs to guarantee security and harmonize the functionalities between the various parts that interact with different technologies. This article highlights the significance of cyber-security infrastructure and shows how to evaluate, prevent, and mitigate <monospace>ICPS</monospace>-based cyber-attacks. We carried out this objective by establishing an adequate semantics for <monospace>ICPS</monospace>’s entities and their composition, which includes social actors that act differently than mobile robots and automated processes. This article also provides the feasible attacks generated by a reinforcement learning mechanism based on multiple criteria that selects both appropriate actions for each <monospace>ICPS</monospace> component and the possible countermeasures for mitigation. To efficiently analyze <monospace>ICPS</monospace>’s security, we proposed a model-checking-based framework that relies on a set of predefined attacks from where the security requirements are used to assess how well the model is secure. Finally, to show the effectiveness of the proposed solution, we model, analyze, and evaluate the <monospace>ICPS</monospace> security on two real use cases.

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“…Kumar et al [20] introduced an attack-fault tree formalism to describe attack scenarios; they conduct formal analyses by using Uppaal-SMC in order to obtain quantitative estimations on the impact of both system failures and security threats. Cheh et al [4] used Uppaal-SMC to do statistical model checking on a railway system to assess the safety of the system under attack. Like us, they tied safety analyses to security analyses and consider an attack that manipulates the communication messages exchanged between the signaling components of the railway system (this affects the speed of the trains and the routes that they take).…”

Section: Conclusion Related and Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact Analysis of Cyber-Physical Attacks on a Water Tank System via Statistical Model Checking

Munteanu

Pasqua

Merro

2020

Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Formal Methods in Software Engineering

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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are integrations of distributed computing systems with physical processes that monitor and control entities in a physical environment. Although the range of their applications include several critical domains, the current trend is to verify CPSs with simulation-test systems rather than formal methodologies. In this paper, we test the effectiveness of statistical model checking, within the MODEST TOOLSET, when analyzing the security of a non-trivial quadruple-tank water system equipped with an ad-hoc intrusion detection system (IDS) capable of mitigating attacks. Our goal is to evaluate the impact of three carefully chosen cyber-physical attacks, i.e., attacks targeting sensors and/or actuators of the system with potential consequences on the safety of the inner physical process. Our security analysis estimates both the physical impact of the attacks and the performance of the proposed IDS. CCS CONCEPTS • Computer systems organization → Sensors and actuators; • Software and its engineering → Model checking.

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Determining Tolerable Attack Surfaces that Preserves Safety of Cyber-Physical Systems

Cited by 7 publications

References 21 publications

PLC Logic-Based Cybersecurity Risks Identification for ICS

PLC Logic-Based Cybersecurity Risks Identification for ICS

Assessing the Severity of Smart Attacks in Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems

Impact Analysis of Cyber-Physical Attacks on a Water Tank System via Statistical Model Checking

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